

R 350137

JPRS 81945

7 October 1982

# West Europe Report

No. 2041

19980831 076

**FBIS**

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

REPRODUCED BY  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL  
INFORMATION SERVICE  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
SPRINGFIELD, VA 22161

9  
84  
A05

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

JPRS 81945

7 October 1982

# West Europe Report

No. 2041



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

7 October 1982

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 2041

## CONTENTS

## THEATER FORCES

## FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

- Admiral Bethge on Naval Lessons From Falklands War  
(Ansgar Bethge Interview; RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND  
WELT, 6 Aug 82) ..... 1

## TERRORISM

## SPAIN

- Police Kill Basque ETA-M Leader, Capture Others  
(AFP, 26 Sep 82) ..... 6
- Briefs  
Naval NCO Killed ..... 7

## ENERGY ECONOMICS

## FRANCE

- Energy Control Agency Seeks Funds Through New Tax  
(Didier Dury; LES ECHOS, 12 Aug 82) ..... 8
- Briefs  
Elf Loses Canadian Partners ..... 10

## ECONOMIC

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

- French-Spanish Tension Grows in View of Spain Joining EEC  
(Martine Royo; LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE, 23 Aug 82) ..... 11

Spanish Agriculture Minister on Relations With France (Jose Luis Alvarez Interview; LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE, 23 Aug 82) .....	18
GREECE	
New Unit in Greek Weapons Industry (ELEVTHEROTYPIA, 27 Aug 82) .....	20
Good Test Results on Petroleum Well (TA NEA, 29 Aug 82) .....	21
New Chromite Find in Kozani (RIZOSPASTIS, 28 Aug 83) .....	22
TURKEY	
Yilmaz Outlines Functions of TURK-IS (TERCUMAN, 9 Sep 82) .....	23
POLITICAL	
AUSTRIA	
Kreisky's Strong Position, Chances for Re-Election (Hanni Konitzer; FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 18 Sep 82)	26
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY	
Stoltenberg on CDU's Political, Economic Strategy (Gerhard Stoltenberg Interview; DIE WELT, 7 Aug 82)	30
Analysis of Peace Movement, Soviet Influence (Gerhard Wettig; AUSSENPOLITIK, No 3, 1982) .....	35
GREECE	
KKE-Int. Announcement on New Economic Policy (I AVGI, 27 Aug 82) .....	52
KKE-Int. Communique on Press Crisis (I AVGI, 29 Aug 82) .....	54
SPAIN	
Gonzalez Working To Open PSOE Without Giving Up Real Powers (ABC, 25 Aug 82) .....	56

UGT Prepared for Trade Union Elections (Anton Saracibar Interview; EL SOCIALISTA, 11-17 Aug 82)	59
TURKEY	
DISK Trial Continues With Torture Allegation (CUMHURIYET, 9 Sep 82) .....	65
MILITARY	
FRANCE	
Helicopters, Ships, Regiments Landing in Lebanon Listed (COLS BLEUS, various dates) .....	68
Tank, Paratroop Infantry Regiments Role of Aircraft	
Areas for Possible Austerity in Military Budget Discussed (Georges Vincent; DEFENSE NATIONALE, Aug-Sep 82) .....	71
GENERAL	
GREECE	
Greek Language Teaching in Soviet Schools Reported (ELEVTHEROTYPIA, 24 Aug 82) .....	75
KKE-Int. Message to Romania (I AVGI, 24 Aug 82) .....	77
Briefs Possible Salonica-Plovdiv Connection	78

ADMIRAL BETHGE ON NAVAL LESSONS FROM FALKLANDS WAR

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 6 Aug 82 p 8

[Interview with Vice Admiral Ansgar Bethge, Chief of Staff of the FRG Navy;  
Interview Conducted by Wolfgang Hoepker]

[Text] The ranking West German naval officer has, for the first time, given his appraisal of the lessons learned from the Falkland Islands conflict. His judgment: West German naval planning still proves to be correct.

[Question] Seapower and sea-control have been household words in Germany for decades. Do they still have any meaning in light of recent events in the South Atlantic?

[Answer] We have, within NATO, created new concepts which do, in a sense, reflect the idea of sea-control but which, because of the development of new weapons systems of vastly greater destructive power, have to be looked at in a different way. On the one hand, there is the concept of sea-control, that is, the exercise of control over an area which comprises both sea and air space. Secondly, there is the concept of sea-denial, which means denying your enemy the use of the sea for his operations, within the limits of time and space. During the Falklands conflict, the area of the islands was under Argentine air dominance though superiority at sea lay in the hands of the British and these two sub-components allowed neither side to exercise sea-control in the traditional sense of the term. This discrepancy also led to the fact that the British had to accept relatively heavy losses to their naval forces while the Argentines' air force suffered heavy losses. Argentina, a land power, stood opposed to Great Britain's naval strength.

[Question] Do large naval surface vessels still have a chance in light of modern missile weaponry?

[Answer] In my opinion, it would be a mistake to draw conclusions about the general value, or the lack of it, in the case of surface naval forces from the

type of duel situation which was the case in the Falkland Islands. Take, for example, the loss of the "Sheffield." The ship was designed for antisubmarine warfare in the North Atlantic. Its designers simply did not take into account the possibility of a threat from the air as happened in the Falklands, so that the "Sheffield" was inadequately armed in this respect. Add to this, what seems to have been an unfortunate tactical disposition allowing enemy aircraft to reach the vicinity of the destroyer without having been observed.

[Question] Isn't an adequate air defense umbrella decisive for the success of a naval operation?

[Answer] Correct. It would be hard to conceive of a naval conflict today without a broad-range air and sea reconnaissance from the air. The British Navy did not have such an air-sea reconnaissance aircraft in the Falklands which could observe intruding aircraft and transmit their positions. The Argentines, on the other hand, were able to spot all British movements using such an aircraft and then to pass this information on directly to their own air force. The larger U.S. aircraft carriers (not those used by the British) do have reconnaissance aircraft capable of remaining airborne for long periods and with extremely effective radar equipment and communications with surface forces.

[Question] So an aircraft carrier of the type deployed by the U.S. Navy would be invulnerable thanks to its escort defense system?

[Answer] That would be claiming too much; even it is vulnerable, but with a very large safety margin built in. It is extremely difficult to approach these carriers without being observed, which holds true not only for surface vessels and aircraft, but for submarines as well. In our own naval frontier, the area off the coast of North Germany, we have numerous air fields--land bases from which missiles, long-range patrol aircraft, reconnaissance and fighter-bomber aircraft can operate in order to spot hostile naval forces promptly and be able to take necessary defensive measures. In a broad-range area of naval operations, the carrier continues to carry out a function which still cannot be replaced by any other weapons system.

[Question] The South Atlantic lies outside the area covered by the NATO treaty, north of the Tropic of Cancer. Can this demarcation still be justified? Doesn't just one look at the Cape route, which is so vital to Western interests, require that the South Atlantic also be included in joint defense planning?

[Answer] This demarcation was a politically deliberate one and ought not to be changed politically. Because if we expand the area of NATO responsibility, we would also have to extend the obligation for automatic assistance to other maritime areas, to their adjoining land areas and to other countries. This is more likely to heighten the danger of conflict rather than contribute to any effort for peace. It is still another question whether those countries which



are absolutely dependent upon imports of oil and raw materials should agree upon a policy of mutual assistance in the event of a threat to these sea lanes or to the production of raw materials in the countries of their origin. This would be linked to a consultative process but it would not be tied to any automatic obligation for assistance.

[Question] Did the withdrawal of large British naval forces to the South Atlantic indicate any weakening of the defense of the North Atlantic?

[Answer] There is no doubt that this did weaken the naval presence of the West in the North Atlantic. Yet of the forces which the British maintain in the North Atlantic, the North Sea and the Sea of Norway, only a few were sent to the South Atlantic. The units were drawn from contingents employed for the defense of the Eastern Atlantic. I can see no general weakening of NATO naval presence in the North Atlantic and now, after the end of the Falklands conflict, none at all. Even considering their losses, the British have sufficient destroyers and frigates in readiness in the event of a crisis situation in the North Atlantic.

[Question] How does the general situation look today with respect to screening off the Soviet threat from the North Sea and the Baltic Sea?

[Answer] Under certain conditions, Western naval forces are strong enough to be able to exercise sea-control for resupply via the Atlantic for areas that are vital for Europeans in the event of a crisis. What remains an open question is whether every hostile submarine in this region could be kept under surveillance and, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, be effectively dealt with. Even today it is extremely difficult to keep submarines constantly under surveillance. With respect to surface naval forces, I have no doubt that we can continuously monitor and control any hostile forces.

[Question] Concerning the role of the Bundesmarine [West German Navy] in the West's naval defense policy: Has the Falklands conflict opened up any new horizons, say with respect to the frigates of the Bremen class or the production program for the Tornado which is scheduled to replace the Starfighter?

[Answer] To this I would have to answer very clearly: no. We can look upon our planning and procurement efforts as having been fully validated. The naval fighter-bomber Tornado, with its Kormoran missile, poses a serious threat to hostile surface vessels. We have taken the right course with the outfitting of our frigates and our torpedo boats with modern electronics and missiles. The experiences of the Falklands has given us no cause to change our procurement plans. On the contrary, it has confirmed the rightness of our choices.

[Question] What conclusions will the Soviet Union, which, as we saw, kept its distance during the Falklands war, draw from this conflict?

[Answer] The Soviet Fleet did keep its distance during the Falklands conflict, though for political reasons. They would also have found it very difficult to operate in a region so far removed from their home ports. To what degree the Soviets have learned any lessons from this war which might apply to their own navy is hard to say--meaning naval armament in the broadest sense, which would include reconnaissance, satellite and communications systems. Soviet naval armament, to our eyes, is designed for employment anywhere in the world. The Soviets do have satellites and they are apparently in a position to transmit data from these satellites to ships at sea and they are certainly going now to expand this capability. But I don't believe that they are going to arrive at any totally new concepts.

[Question] Hasn't the war in the South Atlantic had some positive effect, in that it has shown the West's will to defend itself to have credibility?

[Answer] The Soviets were doubtless surprised at the sharp reaction of the British Government and have certainly taken respectful note of the fact that Great Britain was able, in a short time, to dispatch a substantial military force over a great distance and to employ a task force far from its home ports --an enormous accomplishment, which will certainly leave an impression upon the East.

[Question] East-West tension has increasingly tended to make itself felt in international waters throughout the world. What can the Bundesmarine do in this situation?

[Answer] The German naval command can make no direct contribution to this problem. Indirectly we can contribute by replacing naval forces which the major naval powers might withdraw from the area of the Northern Frontier so as to show a greater presence, for example, in the Gulf region. I also believe that we could be able, to a limited extent, to close the gaps which might be created by such a move. This would be conceivable through the deployment of our new frigates which, with their modern systems, could cover a much broader radius.

[Question] How far north would such an intervention extend, say as far as the Norwegian harbor complex of Bergen?

[Answer] That could not be limited regionally; it would depend upon the situation, upon the way things develop. Our first assumption is that the region of the new frigates deployment would be the North Sea and a portion of the Sea of Norway.

[Question] The Baltic Sea lies outside the deployment area of the new frigates?

[Answer] They have not been designed for the relatively limited area of the Baltic Sea, that's obvious. Let me add that the various weapons systems of the navy have been designed for those sea areas in the Northern Flank where naval defense operations would have to be conducted. Any deployment outside this area could only come to pass after a consultation process with the governments of the West, in the event that critical developments would make such a step necessary.

9878

CSO: 3103/640

TERRORISM

SPAIN

POLICE KILL BASQUE ETA-M LEADER, CAPTURE OTHERS

NC261902 Paris AFP in English 1843 GMT 26 Sep 82

[Text] San Sebastian, North Spain, 26 Sep (AFP)--Spanish police today struck a blow against the Basque Separatist Organisation ETA-Military, killing the leader of a four-man commando group at San Sebastian and capturing the other members.

Fernando Barrio Olano, code-named Liberado, head of the Sega commando unit, was reportedly killed when he opened fire on police who had surrounded the apartment where he was hiding.

It is the first time that an ETA-M member has been killed in a shootout with police since the leaders of the "Madrid" column of the group, Josetxu and Gogor, fell in a hail of police bullets last October 21.

But three other ETA-M members have died this year: Two were blown to pieces while placing a bomb in a power station and another was accidentally killed by comrades as they attempted to shoot a municipal police chief.

Today's shooting comes less than two weeks after four policemen died in the second most murderous anti-police attack in Basque history.

It also comes only 48 hours after the head of the anti-terrorist brigade tightened security controls in the Basque country to counter what he said were plans by the organisation to disrupt Spain's forthcoming general election campaign.

In today's incident, police said they seized a number of arms, some ammunition and a number of documents.

In another operation last January 20, police netted five tons of arms belonging to the separatist movement.

Since then, police claim to have dismantled (?right) commando units of ETA-M and [words indistinct] May 18 captured another arms depot of the group at Barracaldo in the [word indistinct] country.

CSO: 3500/2

TERRORISM

SPAIN

BRIEFS

NAVAL NCO KILLED--Bilbao, (Spain), 22 Sep (EFE)--A navy noncommissioned officer was attacked and murdered today at 0730 (0530 GMT) in the town of Erandio, very near Bilbao, in Spain's Basque region. Emilio Fernandez Arias was on a street when he was shot. According to initial reports, he had two bullet wounds in his head. Shells for the type of ammunition used by "ETA" [Basque Nation and Liberty], a terrorist organization, have been found. [Text] [PA220820 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0653 GMT 22 Sep 82]

CSO: 3548/4

## ENERGY CONTROL AGENCY SEEKS FUNDS THROUGH NEW TAX

Paris LES ECHOS in French 12 Aug 82 p 4

[Article by Didier Dury: "Energy Conservation: The Government Soon to Consider a Bill for Surtax on Electricity and Gas"]

[Text] The directors of the French Agency for Energy Management (AFME) are not laying down their weapons. Before the end of the year they again expect to propose to the government the creation of a surtax on electricity and gas. They are even predicting the amount--0.4 centimes per kWh--and point out that "industry does not invest enough in energy conservation," as the agency director, Cubaud, notes.

Consequently, he is proposing to industry the use of a system similar to the construction program that he presented yesterday to the press in the company of Michel Rolant, the president of AFME.

Once the provision relating to construction is in place (the funds will be available starting in mid-October), it is clear that priority will be given to industry. The launching of the current program will make it possible to free larger sums in the agency budget for industry. Not enough, however.

All the more so because public funds will be distributed more parsimoniously in 1983. While within the AFME all is calm on the subject of research--funding should increase by 20 percent--for the rest only an increase in current francs is being discussed.

The surtax on gas and electricity could remedy this situation. A policy of energy conservation in line with the ambitious objectives defined last year would require 5 billion francs a year, according to Cubaud. The agency now only has 3 billion francs available. The will to launch actions in the industrial sector is so strong that the director of the AFME predicts "specific arrangements with international financial organizations" if its proposition is not well received.

500,000 TOE and 50,000 Jobs

The building and public works profession, for its part, will not have to wait long, since it is the one to profit the most broadly from the construction

program, partially financed by a tax on automobile fuels (home heating oil was excluded from the provision) to be collected starting next November. Its proceeds--approximately a billion francs for a full year--collected through a special fund, will make it possible to pay interest on the 4 billion francs that the Deposit Bank will borrow.

The financial operation will be launched on the French market around 15 September.

Of this overall sum, 2 billion francs will be devoted to roads and public transportation and 2 billion as well to energy conservation and new energy forms (LES ECHOS, 9 August).

As for the latter category, this help will take the form of subsidies. Depending on the specific case, they will cover from 20 percent (heating) to 70 percent (schools) of the total bill, with the Deposit Bank furnishing additional loans.

According to Rolant, 6 billion in construction will thus be made possible, allowing the creation or the consolidation of 50,000 jobs and the conservation of 500,000 tOE. And heating costs should increase less quickly.

The AFME will handle the most important files directly. For cities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, it will work with the general and departmental councils. Departmental committees for mastery of energy will finally be created.

Table 1.                      Where Will Public Monies Go?

	<u>Total AFME Subsidies</u>	<u>Share of subsidies in construction costs</u>
Local Municipalities	400 million francs	30%
Hospitals--Category 1		
Category 2	160 million francs	50%
Second Degree		
Secondary Establishments	200 million francs	70%
Public Housing	900 million francs	40%
Heating	340 million francs	20%

9969

CS0: 3100/903

## BRIEFS

ELF LOSES CANADIAN PARTNERS--The two Canadian companies, Sceptre Resources and Scarboro Resources, are getting out of prospecting for oil in Libya where they were associated to the extent of 10 percent and 5 percent respectively with the five concessions held by Elf-Aquitaine. In fact, the financial effort to carry out the 1982-1984 prospecting program exceeded their means, considering the difficulties currently being encountered in the international petroleum industry. [Text] [Paris LES ECHOS in French 11 Aug 82 p 4] 9969

CSO: 3100/903



## FRENCH-SPANISH TENSION GROWS IN VIEW OF SPAIN JOINING EEC

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 23 Aug 82 pp 28-32

[Article by Martine Royo: "Spain Is Beating at Europe's Door"]

[Text] In this film serial that Spain's membership in the Common Market has become, France continues to play the role of the "bad guy." Supported, though, by Brussels.

It is summer in the Pyrenees. On the French side, overturned Spanish trucks, tons of smashed fruit and admonitions not to go to Spain. On the Spanish side, a flood of protests. "Every time your farmers attack our trucks," charged a high-level official at the Ministry of Agriculture in Madrid, "the French police look the other way." In retaliation, a dozen Spanish chambers of commerce have asked for a boycott of French products.

It makes no difference that our fellow countrymen have always preferred Spain for their vacations, that France is the number one client of the Spanish, that the French president has visited Madrid! The discord is getting uglier. Because Paris keeps closing the door to the Common Market that Spain keeps trying to open. "Our trading partners will thank us later," stated the Quai d'Orsay. "We have already been burned by Great Britain, which periodically asks for a renegotiation. Greece is demanding special treatment. There is no question of signing a blank check with Spain."

Another problem is Basque terrorism. Madrid accuses France of being a haven for ETA [Basque Fatherland the Liberty Group] terrorists (the Basque separatist organization). "Not so," stated a colleague of Claude Cheysson, minister of external relations. "France will always refuse to be a sanctuary for terrorists. Why should we put more effort into hunting the Basques than the Spanish police?"

"When a couple divorces, whose fault is it?" asked a high-level Spanish Government official. "Each thinks it is the other's."

Who is wrong? Who is right? How can we untangle the skein of passion, political motives, French-Spanish interests and the accounts of Europe?

"I love you--me neither" is somewhat the passionate texture of French-Spanish relations. The Madrid "intelligentsia," which looks longingly on Paris, suffers from the indifference, or even the condescension, that it detects too often in the French. "Spain has suffered too much during the last 40 years to be outlawed by other nations," lamented Xavier Patrouillard, who heads Rhone-Poulenc's general staff in Spain.

Yes, But

And what is the value of 60,000 fruit and vegetable producers from Languedoc-Roussillon, who demonstrate in July and August just as they go hunting in September, compared to French industries located in Spain for almost a decade? During a recent meeting of the French Chamber of Commerce in Madrid, the managers of French firms were all more or less desolate at the failure of Francois Mitterrand's visit to Madrid at the end of June. The French president intended to explain the French position without giving in on any fundamentals. In sum, yes to Spain's entry into the EEC but without skewing the membership. Yes to cooperation against Basque terrorists, but no question of extraditing them. France definitely intends to remain a hospitable country.

This position, which has the quality of being frank, hardly considers Spanish sensitivities. "Can it not be taken into account when a people, perhaps naively, confuse democracy and membership in the Community?" asked Daniel de Busturia, Calvo Sotelo's assistant for European affairs.

"Let's not add Spain's miseries to those of the EEC," exclaimed President Mitterrand in Madrid. Words that shocked. Many Spaniards saw in them an unpleasant allusion to the poverty of certain regions in Spain. On the national level, per capita income is less than half what it is in the EEC countries. "Blunders added to those made in the past by Giscard d'Estaing," summed up the head of a firm in Madrid. "Paris thinks it should be a teacher and still treats Spain like a Third World country."

Affronts, blunders and misunderstandings find an often exaggerated echo in the Spanish media, which is virulent toward France and even harms French interests in Spain. The decision made last summer to forbid the import of Spanish canned goods for 3 months (an adulterated oil had caused several hundred deaths in Spain), perfectly well-founded from a hygienic viewpoint, was followed by a boycott of French products. In Valladolid, for example, shopkeepers voluntarily placed in their windows the sign suggested on page 1 of the weekly magazine CAMBIO 16 that said "French products are not sold here."

A change in style: Today, a well-orchestrated press campaign that started up after Francois Mitterrand's visit suggests a refusal to validate the newly nationalized French firms' interests in Spanish companies. According to Spanish law, authorizations to invest granted to foreign private firms become obsolete if there is a nationalization in their home country. The designated victims: Saint-Gobain, Thomson-Brandt, Rhone-Poulenc, Pechiney and the French General Electric Company (CGE). A total of Fr 9 to 10 billion

turnover in 1981. "If Calvo Sotelo's government refuses to renew the authorizations, who will buy?" asked Marc de Nadaillac, head of Saint-Gobain in Spain. Spanish firms do not have any money. And here the state is also having financial problems. It seems that the Spanish Government has given assurances to businessmen. Fragile assurances. "The present government is not strong," remarked de Nadaillac, "and it undoubtedly will not make any decisions before the parliamentary elections." The voting could in fact be moved up to November and could give power to the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), which won 60 percent of the seats in Andalusia last spring. The leader of the PSOE, Felipe Gonzalez, a moderate who is closer to the German Social Democrats than to the French Socialists and little inclined toward nationalization, does not frighten French business leaders in Spain.

"Our public sector is already soaking up money like a sponge; Spanish taxpayers sunk 100 billion pesetas into it in 1981 and that's enough," said Joaquin Almuner, the PSOE's economic coordinator, who has proposed fixing up the public sector as a first priority. Only after that would he expand to creating new firms in high technology sectors.

From Madrid's viewpoint, Paris is hardly making any efforts to gain the good will of the Spanish. Spain's membership in the Common Market, the central issue of the discord, has turned into a film serial in which France has the role of the "bad guy." France, however, is supported by Brussels. "We always closed our eyes to the questions that Paris is now asking and that it was already asking at the time of Giscard d'Estaing," admitted a high-level Common Market official. It is a fact that the Commission, like the member states, never studied all the consequences of expansion. "Its membership will cost several billion dollars, which is inconceivable when you look at the state of its finances," declared a spokesman for the Commission. "Unless we review the system and go over the one-percent VAT [value added tax] ceiling. However, most member states are against that."

The mistake of the 10 was in not having asked the question sooner, while they were flooding Spain with nice words and declarations of friendship. Last month, Francois Mitterrand asked the Commission to have each member state draw up a list of the problems that would be raised by Spain's and Portugal's membership. A clever way to show that France is not the only one to see obstacles in expansion. "When a member state resists and holds back, the others, who would benefit from doing the same, are quiet and let the first one take the blows," admitted a colleague of Lorenzo Natali, the commissioner in charge of expansion.

When the Germans find out what Spanish membership will cost them, they will be less enthusiastic," remarked a colleague of Cheysson. Will West Germany, the number one EEC "payer" (\$2 billion net per year, one-quarter of its budget deficit) happily pay the Spanish bill? Will it accept having the Spanish work force circulating freely in the EEC while there are 2 million unemployed in Spain, all of them potential emigrants?

Will Great Britain or Belgium, who, like France, are sinking vast sums into saving their steel industry and laying off millions of workers, be more

accepting than Paris when Spain modernizes its steel industry through large-scale subsidies, a steel industry that is not subject to EEC rules?

Lastly, what will become of the favored relations the EEC had with other Mediterranean countries such as Morocco and Tunisia, current suppliers to the EEC of products (citrus fruit, olive oil, etc) that would have to be bought in Spain tomorrow because of the EEC preference?

There still remains the heart of the problem, the famous agricultural question, which can be summed up in the confrontation in the Pyrenees and which bothers the French especially. "Letting Spain enter the EEC while agricultural Europe still has no organization for the fruit and vegetable market threatens to wipe out French Mediterranean agriculture," affirmed Chandernagor's office. Why? "Because of Spain's production potential for these foodstuffs, it could both flood the European market and work profitably to take it easy the rest of the year," added an expert.

"Madness!" exclaimed Francisco Botella, first secretary to the Spanish minister of agriculture. "We are not going to destroy the market; it is to our advantage to receive high prices." While waiting, the Ministry of Agriculture recently decided to allocate 59 billion pesetas in guaranteed credits to Spanish farmers and to favor irrigation. "Forty thousand additional hectares irrigated each year," declared Botella. "No more than our competitors." A figure that is questioned by French experts who estimate it to be more like 80,000 hectares. Generally, these lands produce fruit and vegetables, not corn or soybeans, in which Spain is deficient. For example, the Almeria "hothouses for early fruits and vegetables" will go from 9,000 to 20,000 hectares thanks to a foreign company with capital that is apparently Dutch or Arabic.

"Sadness"

The large Tage-Sigura project in the region of Cartagena and Murcia, which was begun under Franco, will be completed thanks to German capital. This province, which specializes in citrus fruit and fruit trees, is gradually switching fruit and vegetables. An illness named "sadness" recently struck the orange trees. The highly unionized labor force specializing in picking oranges is costing the growers more and more.

The cost of the agricultural labor force is at the center of the French-Spanish controversy. "Farm salaries," argue the French producers, "are 30 to 40 percent lower than ours (including social insurance expenditures)." The Spanish reply: "The difference does not exceed 10 to 20 percent. And although we have the sun, you have more and cheaper water."

What do the statistics say? The average farm salary in France was Fr 19 per hour in April 1982 compared with Fr 19.8 for a man in Spain but only Fr 13.8 for a woman (of whom there are many at harvest time). Social expenditures account for 37 percent of the salary in France (Fr 56.24 for 8 hours) but only Fr 3.6 per day in Spain. However, during the Strawberry

harvest in Catalonia, the Spanish work force received only Fr 96 per day and the immigrants (usually African), Fr 60.

Is it only the orange pickers in the region of Valencia that receive Fr 19.8 per hour? Can we count on the development of agricultural unionism in Spain to bridge these salary gaps during the transition period, prior to Spain's admission to the Common Market?

Fruit is not the sector of French agriculture most in danger. There is also wine. In Spain, it is better and cheaper than popular French wine. In France, a hectoliter of wine in bulk is worth Fr 170 (for wine with 10 percent alcohol content) and only Fr 70 in Spain (12 or 13 percent alcohol). Some high quality Spanish wines are sold at French table wine prices. In general, the French are familiar only with rioja, which has a price that is comparable to a Cotes-du-Rhone or a "lesser Bordeaux." But on the other side of the Pyrenees there are good quality vintage red wines, cheaper and plentiful.

#### Boom

Spain traditionally produced 30 million hectoliters. In 1979 there was a boom of 50 million hectoliters and today a little more than 40 million (over half of French or Italian production). Thirty million hectoliters had to be distilled last year; there are 10 million left. "It is hard to say that there are not surpluses," the European Commission emphasized.

There is still the problem of olive oil, which leaves the French relatively indifferent but worries the Europeans. It is one of the few Mediterranean products with a guaranteed European price. Spain, which currently subsidizes the consumption of olive oil and taxes imported fats, could ask for the intervention of the EAGGF [European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund] (the Common Market's agricultural piggy bank) for a large portion of its production. The cost as estimated by Brussels: \$1.5 billion. The solution? Taxing vegetable fats imported into the EEC, but this is liable to unleash more American wrath on Europe, which buys from the United States, and come up against the veto of northern European countries, heavy consumers of margarine and not very fond of butter or oil.

An exact accounting of profits and losses needs to be made. French farmers would not have everything to lose upon Spain's entry into the Common Market. Francis Botella has emphasized the complementary nature of the two agricultures. Spain is not very competitive in milk products and meat. Farms in Galicia, the livestock-raising area, are small and not very profitable--5 hectares and five cows on the average. The Spanish market is so protected at present that the French cannot even sell a liter of milk there. The same is true for meat and cereals, which Spain imports from Argentina and the United States rather than from France. As a result, the agricultural balance is deeply in the red; Fr 2.25 billion last year, based on Spanish figures. This makes a cover ratio of 28.5 percent.

What to do? Bet on milk, to the detriment of French vineyard owners and producers of lettuce and tomatoes? No government can take such a social

and political risk. Madrid seems inclined to cooperate. The Madrid government is already cooperating with French Government officials to prevent an excessive shipment of apricots or pears from reaching the French market.

It is up to Calvo Sotelo's government to give Brussels guarantees that its plans for developing agriculture and steel will not create intolerable surpluses for Europe. It is up to the French Government not to systematically give economic difficulties precedence over political advantages. "For an entire day, I talked about lettuce with the highest representatives of the French Government. That's not being serious!" exclaimed Alvarez. For a question of lettuce, Spain cannot fidget indefinitely at the door of the European club.

### A Strong French Presence

France is Spain's number one client, its number three supplier and number two foreign investor after the United States (12 percent, compared to 35 percent of the invested foreign capital). After a slump of several years due to the political instability, investments have rebounded--over 10 billion pesetas (Fr 600 million) in 1980, 8.5 billion last year. There are almost 1,000 companies in Spain in which French firms, small and medium-sized firms as well as subsidiaries of large corporations, have an interest. Of the first 500 French firms, over 100 have branches in Spain.

All the large automobile manufacturers have facilities on the other side of the Pyrenees. Fasa-Renault, a subsidiary of Renault, has become the number one Spanish manufacturer since Seat folded 2 years ago.

Saint-Gobain, leader in the area of plate glass and controlling 55 percent of the molded glass market, has been there since 1905. Michelin, which arrived in 1932, manufactures over 50 percent of the industrial tires in Spain and 50 percent of the automobiles tires. Safa, a subsidiary of Rhone-Poulenc created in 1932, is the number two Spanish firm for synthetic fibers. In the mining sector, Penarroya, which last year celebrated its centennial in Spain, produces 73 percent of the country's lead, 40 percent of its silver and 27 percent of its antimony. Air Liquide is the leader in its sector. Thomson has been there for years in consumer and professional electronics.

The more recent French presence in the food sector is also more discreet, but nevertheless Gervais-Danone, Bongrain-Gerard, Fromagerie Bel, Rivoire and Caret and Generale Alimentaire are there. Lesieur came on the scene 4 years ago and already has 37 percent of the market for cooking oil.

In sales, Carrefour, Promodes, Radar, Mammouth and Auchan control over 90 percent of the department stores. Darty has just opened its first sales outlet.

In the services sector, almost all of the large French banks have had an office in Spain since the proclamation of the June 1978 decree that

liberalized the establishment of foreign banks. Insurance has not been left behind, with 15 subsidiaries of French companies such as UAP, Gan, AGF, etc. Overall, a sizable and relatively unseen French presence because Spanish brands, boards of directors and staffs are made as Spanish as possible.

9720

CSO: 3100/925

## SPANISH AGRICULTURE MINISTER ON RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French 23 Aug 82 p 32

[Interview with Jose Luis Alvarez, Spanish minister of agriculture, date and place not specified]

[Text] A politician rather than a technician, Jose Luis Alvarez, minister of agriculture, is a convinced Francophile. His five children were educated in French schools and his oldest son is engaged to a French woman. This earned the minister some vengeful diatribes in the pro-Franco daily EL ALCAZAR on the topic "He has been sold to the French!" A former mayor of Madrid and member of the centrist party currently in power, Alvarez was formerly minister of transportation.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: Who is at fault in the deterioration of French-Spanish relations? Politicians or farmers?

Jose Luis Alvarez: It would be ridiculous to blame the farmers. Politicians are the ones who direct relations between two countries. In fact, for several years France's policy positions have not seemed to take into account the mutual advantages we would gain from cooperation. Spanish farmers are doing nothing to worsen relations with France, unless you consider it a sin to work to obtain good products at the best prices for French and European consumers. As for French farmers, they apparently also want to have easier access to the Spanish market. We do not consider all French farmers our enemies just because there are a few that are convinced that any methods can be used to defend their selfish interests.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: How did the Left's accession to power in Paris change France's position toward you?

Alvarez: The position of the former French Government was such that we thought we could only win with a change. But that has not been the case.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: Should not the wrongs be shared? Spain holds France responsible for the Basque problem and France has placed too many obstacles to its entry into the Common Market.



Alvarez: No. Just the opposite. The Basque problem would not be what it is if there were not this French staging ground for the terrorists. On the other hand, real technical difficulties are complicating Spain's entry into the Community. The political desire to resolve these difficulties as quickly as possible is missing.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: How do you react to the semi-official French suggestion that a single transitional period be established for Spanish agriculture and industry? Ten years, for example?

Alvarez: The transitional period does not necessarily have to be uniform, but should be suited to reciprocal necessities and set with the intention of facilitating integration, not making it more difficult or maintaining favored situations.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: Do you believe that Spain's entry into the Common Market threatens the common agricultural policy (CAP)?

Alvarez: Spanish agriculture is not so threatening and the CAP is not so delicate. Spain's entry could reinvigorate certain aspects of it and France is one of the countries that would benefit the most from our membership. Fear has never been the driving force of progress.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: How can we prevent your joining by causing a decrease in the price of southern agricultural products?

Alvarez: Our agricultural balance is in the red. Spain's entry would benefit European cereal growers and livestock raisers and would be a risk for their counterparts on the Iberian Peninsula.

LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE: Is Spain still interested in a Mediterranean policy, which has been discussed a great deal but about which nothing has been done?

Alvarez: Spain's interests are linked to those of Western Europe, and we should not forget the friendly historical relations that we have with other regions. Within Europe, we have more in common with France and Italy, for reasons of climate, geography and culture. The difficulties of the Mediterranean economy will be easier to solve by joining together than by fighting. But up to now, short-term problems have won out over long-term considerations.

9720

CSO: 3100/925

## NEW UNIT IN GREEK WEAPONS INDUSTRY

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 27 Aug 82 p 13

[Text] Pavsanias Zakolikas, the deputy national defense minister in charge of the weapons industry, yesterday morning inaugurated in Lavrion the new charge loading unit. Present at the opening ceremonies were Deputy Ministers of National Defense Andonis Drosogiannis and Finance D. Dimosthenopoulos, the chief of the Army General Staff, Major General Dim. Panagopoulos, and Navy General Staff Admiral Pappas, the chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Th. Degiannis, the Gendarmery chief, Major General M. Brillakis, and others.

Speaking at the ceremonies, Greek Weapons Industry [EVO] Chairman of the Board of Directors Vikendios Arsenis emphasized in part that the new unit is one of the most modern with most advanced technology able to meet the needs of [the Greek] Armed Forces and to leave a significant surplus for exports. This is, he said, an investment of 450 million drachmas. Arsenis mentioned specifically the equipment for waste disposal considered to be among the most modern in Europe.

The Charge Loading Unit occupies an area of 3,600 stremmas and employs at this phase 200 persons of various specialties. The unit is used for the loading of large shells. As is known, EVO assembles G3 rifles and 20 and 30mm machineguns, mortars, dynamite, ammunition and the Greek anti-aircraft system Artemis-30.

7520

CSO: 4621/439

## GOOD TEST RESULTS ON PETROLEUM WELL

Athens TA NEA in Greek 29 Aug 82 p 12

/Text/ Kavala 28: from our correspondent, P. Alisanoglou--Following two interruptions due to unforeseen technical problems in the mechanical system, combustion tests started late last night on the oil deposits of the Voreios Prinos I well.

The tests are taking place at three different points of the oil field and from a depth of approximately 2,600 meters. They will last 4 days and the final results will come out on Tuesday with the last test. The first unofficial data yesterday indicated the existence of good quality oil with low sulfur content. There is every indication that these deposits have better density than those of Prinos.

Following these tests there will be further drillings designed to determine the exact area of the deposit which theoretically is large with a potential daily yield in excess of 30,000 barrels.

Due to the discovery of the new deposit, the North Aegean Oil Company postponed until November the drilling of Voreios Prinos II which was to take place west of the island of Thasos in potential oil deposits.

During yesterday's tests complete safety measures were taken to prevent the pollution of the Kavala Gulf. The tests which started yesterday reaffirm the exclusive reports by TA NEA that the Kavala Gulf is a "basin of oil-bearing zones."

7520

CSO: 4621/439

## NEW CHROMITE FIND IN KOZANI

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 28 Aug 83 p 1

/Text/ The ferro-chromium plant in Almyros, Volos, with a total investment of 60 million dollars, will start operating on an experimental basis next month. This unit which is owned by the state enterprise, Greek Iron Ores /ELSI/, is expected to reach full production (at 30,000 tons of iron-chromite per year) in 1983.

Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Kouloubis stated yesterday that 20 million drachmas worth of exploratory work, under the Institute of Geological and Mining Research /IGME/ in 1982 in the metal rich area of Vourinou in Kozani, verified the existence of new deposits of chromite the quality of which is better than initially predicted. As of now, the chromite deposits of Vourinou which will be used exclusively for the ferro-chromium plant are estimated to be 1 million tons compared to 700,000 tons estimated in 1981, and are sufficient to supply this production unit for 15 years at the lower 30,000 tons of iron-chromite capacity per year, or for 11 years at the higher capacity of 40,000 tons.

As underlined by Kouloubis, IGME in cooperation with ELSI is planning even greater efforts for 1983 with a total cost of 80 million drachmas, designed to find deposits for the supply of the unit at the higher level of capacity for at least 20 years. At the same time, IGME and ELSI will continue the exploration both in the area of Kozani and in other areas in Greece to find deposits which will allow the construction of a second unit for a total annual production of 90,000 tons of iron-chromite valued at approximately 90 million dollars.

7520

CSO: 4621/439

## YILMAZ OUTLINES FUNCTIONS OF TURK-IS

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 9 Sep 82 pp 1, 12

[Text] Ankara (TERCUMAN)--The Constitutional Conference arranged by TURK-IS [Turkish Confederation of Labor] was held yesterday in Ankara. TURK-IS President Sevkett Yilmaz said in his opening address, "The intent of this draft constitution is to have a few capitalists dominate not just the economic administration, but the political administration as well."

Referring to the task of unionism as a representative one, Yilmaz said that if the opportunity for this was not allowed, they would conduct policy on their own in the 67 provinces.

Two representatives from each of the more than 800 TURK-IS headquarters in the 67 provinces attended the conference, as well as certain members of the Consultative Assembly.

Sevkett Yilmaz stressed in his speech the provisions concerning union activities of the draft constitution being discussed in the Consultative Assembly. Yilmaz asserted that Turkish workers were treated unfairly in this draft and said:

"With this draft constitution, the state has ceased to be the benevolent social state charged with protecting the poor. The draft constitution attempts to dig up by the roots worker rights and freedoms and the civil rights that make the exercise of them possible."

"The draft constitution was made public on 17 July. We have been working steadily for almost 2 months. We have taken every opportunity to signal a halt to the erroneous course of the constitution. This draft constitution cannot make the future safe nor democracy guaranteed. They seem unable to hear and unable to understand. Are we acting alone? No! Every poor fool, however, ignorant, agrees on the same observation that 'Democracy cannot be guaranteed with this approach, the future cannot be looked forward to with confidence.' The intent of this draft constitution is to have a few capitalists dominate, not just the economic administration, but the political administration as well."

## We Shall Conduct Policy

Sevket Yilmaz asserted that they had not yet lost hope that the erroneous provisions of the draft could be corrected. "We expect the errors to be corrected on behalf of the entire Turkish nation, on behalf of democracy," he said.

Noting that his basic task is to protect and develop the economic and social rights and interests of the workers, Sevket Yilmaz said, "We desire peace. We desire economic and political freedom through democracy. We have always viewed the national interests and the workers' interests as a whole, and we still do. It is sufficient only that injustice not be done."

Yilmaz said that unionism was a representative task, adding:

"We wish to do this properly. Yet if it remains impossible, we shall perform the task of developing and protecting rights and freedoms in another arena, we shall throw off our neckties and don our overalls to conduct policy on our own in the 67 provinces. Democracy is the regime of the majority. Then everyone will see whether four or five capitalists are to rule Turkey, or the majority of the people."

## TRT Is Unfair

In one part of his speech, TURK-IS President Yilmaz spoke of TRT [Turkish Radio and TV Administration] broadcasts. He said that the TRT was biased and failed to give TURK-IS statements the coverage they should have. "Don't mind the TRT. It is sad, but everyone sees that the TRT is unfair. Nobody believes it," he said.

Speaking next, TURK-IS Educational Secretary Kaya Ozdemir explained what the confederation has been doing since 17 July. He criticized the provisions related to union activities in the draft constitution under discussion in the Consultative Assembly and said there was an attempt with these provisions to retreat from worker rights.

Ozdemir said that TURK-IS would pursue the struggle in this regard to the end.

Kaya Ozdemir also criticized TRT broadcasts. He said that the TRT was not giving the voice of TURK-IS the importance it should have in its public broadcasts and that it was not doing its job.

## TURK-IS Bulletin

The bulletin prepared by the TURK-IS Board of Directors was then read at the conference. The bulletin, adopted by a vote of approval, says, "The draft constitution falls decidedly short of providing the pluralist, libertarian democracy which is the political regime of preference of the Turkish nation."

The TURK-IS bulletin, noting that the imbalance in employment, production, investment and income distribution will continue to grow if the draft constitution is adopted as is, contains the following views:

"The principle vehicle of the free democratic system in balancing the conflicts which erupt in social and economic life and allowing them to culminate in peace is the free union system based on free bargaining and the right to strike. To take instead an approach contrary even to international rules and institutionalize in the Constitution the Supreme Arbitration Council, which the public was informed was a temporary organ, assuming that labor peace can be established through the existing arrangement, is a mistake inviting frightening consequences."

The bulletin contends that, in addition to failing to provide for people to make a living, for peace and freedom, the draft constitution is also of such a nature as to prohibit entirely any development toward adequate production and equality. It then reads as follows:

"The arrangements made, instead of the realization of the social, economic and political peace to be established by the means which the libertarian democratic regime requires, leave those who work confronted by the choice of resorting to a ruthless political struggle as the only way out. Those assuming that those who work will not engage in such a struggle owing to their lack of economic power and the restriction of their liberties and intending to protect their interests with this draft constitution will assuredly be mistaken. It must be known that TURK-IS will not bow to injustice."

The TURK-IS Conference came to an end with a closing statement by President Sevket Yilmaz. He said that the unity and cohesion demonstrated at the conference would constitute a reply to the opponents of unionism. Noting also that they did not have the same "trouble" as the check-off, "No one can make the members of the TURK-IS board of directors cancel each other out." said Sevket Yilmaz.

8349

CSO: 4654/448

## KREISKY'S STRONG POSITION, CHANCES FOR RE-ELECTION

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 18 Sep 82 p 6

[Article by Hanni Konitzer: "A Chancellor People Are Willing to Forgive Just About Anything"]

[Text] Vienna, 17 September—Even those who know about Austrian politics from the inside are astounded again and again about what almost 72 year-old Bruno Kreisky can come up with in the way of provocative statements and even with controversial decisions inside his own party without suffering a loss in his huge popularity.

Consider the following recent examples: Here is the chancellor of neutral Austria carrying on what almost amounts to a private war with the prime minister of Israel on problems of the Near East which, after all, are quite removed from Vienna's concerns—with both politicians not shying away from calling each other names. Kreisky goes so far as to accuse Begin of being a fascist and says irately that he wants nothing ever to do with this kind of Israel again. As a mediator between the Palestinians and the Israelis, he says, he can no longer be considered, since he has taken a partisan position in favor "of the persecuted and oppressed Palestinians." Whatever Kreisky may feel about these issues as a private citizen, it is at least unusual for the head of government of a neutral country to make loud and sharply worded partisan declarations at every opportunity. The Austrian foreign ministry is anything but happy about all this. Following every attack by Kreisky against the Jerusalem government, the foreign ministry is quick to point to the "correct relations" which exist between Austria and Israel.

Even more unpleasant from the Austrian foreign policy point of view than Kreisky's feud with the Begin government are his repeated harsh words of criticism for President Reagan and his policies—although he does utter a surprising word of praise for the American leader from time to time. One such instance is his hearty approval of Reagan's Near East plan which he views as a kind of testimony for the soundness of his own support for the Palestinians. On other occasions, however, the chancellor of neutral Austria has accused the Washington government of mendacity, boundless hypocrisy, political inexperience and utter madness.

Now that he has gotten old, it seems Kreisky no longer acts the part of a clever and astute foreign policy expert as in days goneby. In the old days, such statements would have not slipped out—particularly not against the United States. One of the basic elements of Austrian foreign policy after all



is to have good relations with both superpowers in the interest of the security of this small country located between East and West. Kreisky himself has often stood by this precept. Still, for the first time during the postwar era, there are "irritations" in Austro-American relations. This is not only apparent in statements by American political figures. Another indication of it is that the post of American ambassador to Austria has remained unfilled since the spring of 1982 and is not likely to be filled before the end of the year.

To improve relations with the Reagan government, Kreisky had been trying to get himself invited to Washington this year. But he was turned down. Reagan, it was said, does not wish to meet with him at this time. Perhaps this is an aftereffect of American displeasure at the official visit by Libyan chief of state Qaddafi to Vienna this past March. The invitation to Qaddafi had as such raised eyebrows in Washington. And when Qaddafi used Austria as a podium from which to attack American policy and President Reagan personally, American annoyance rose to new heights. Nonetheless, the chancellor agreed just recently to a request by Qaddafi to meet with him on short notice in Vienna on his way back from a visit to East Bloc countries. On 10 September, the two political leaders met for one hour at Vienna airport.

What do the Austrians think of these escapades of their chancellor's? The overwhelming majority of them is not interested in foreign policy. For most Austrians the most important thing is that Kreisky gives them the feeling that a bit of the oldtime importance of Imperial Vienna is being preserved. Every visit by some Arab potentate is treated as an interesting spectacle and pays off for Kreisky in terms of domestic reputation in the eyes of the people. Among large segments of the Austrian population, the chancellor's attacks against Israel meet with far more approval than criticism. But Kreisky will not admit that there is a related danger that anti-Semitism in Austria could increase as a consequence.

Next spring, probably on 15 May, parliamentary elections will be held in Austria and Kreisky has placed himself at the disposal of the Socialist Party as its candidate for chancellor once again. By that time 73 years old, he will be facing the toughest test of his political career in all likelihood. His optimistic forecast that he will attain an absolute majority for his party again despite age and poor health—it would be the fourth time in a row—does not seem totally unfounded in view of his continued popularity. But it will not be easy. Signs of wear and tear in the 12 year-old Socialist regime cannot be overlooked. Thus far, the chancellor's charisma and authority have succeeded in covering them over so that growing criticism of government policy has not yet had an impact on the voters' decisions. But the question is whether that will also apply in 1983.

The country's economic problems will be the main election issue. The real question is whether the voters who are now worrying about their jobs in Austria as everywhere else will trust the Socialists or the People's Party to protect their jobs for them. Kreisky's old slogan that he would rather run up a debt of one billion Schillings than throw a few hundred people out of work

still has a lot of popular appeal. The worry about a huge budget deficit tied to such maneuvers concerns only a small group who think in economic terms, however. What speaks for the governing Socialists is that the Austrians have never been as well off as they are today.

The most recent opinion polls give the SPÖ 48 to 49 percent of the vote; the ÖVP 42 to 44 percent, and the FPÖ 6 to 7 percent. Thus, the SPÖ clearly does not attain an absolute majority. But Kreisky is convinced the "small deficit" can be made up. The Socialists, he says, have hit low points prior to an election more than once and then always overcome them by waging a forceful campaign.

But will Kreisky be able to stand the pace of another strenuous election campaign? In the absence of his own strong personal commitment, the absolute majority can hardly be attained. Compared to the winter of 1981/82, the chancellor's health has improved somewhat. Nonetheless, the thought that Kreisky might become sick again a few weeks prior to the election causes the SPÖ campaign strategists sleepless nights.

Kreisky himself appears not to be worrying about such eventualities. Otherwise, he would not have rejected Deputy SPÖ Chairman Blecha's plan so emphatically that the party should name Vice Chancellor Fred Sinowatz as Kreisky's official successor now as a prophylactic measure against a political vacuum in case Kreisky got sick again. But Kreisky simply does not seem able to tolerate a strong man with the official status of successor next to him. He also assures people that he not only means to run for chancellor once more but also to head the government for most of the next legislative session. Around 1986, he says, he would actually quit. By then, he will be in his middle seventies and it would be time for a change.

The chancellor also will not listen to the polls which unanimously say that the Austrians would most like to see a return to a grand coalition between the Socialists and the People's Party. People think that such a coalition would offer the best prospects for a solution of the great economic and social problems. Kreisky, however, turned down a grand coalition in no uncertain terms just a few days ago, saying that he would under no circumstances head a SPÖ/ÖVP government as chancellor. A grand coalition, he said, was too cumbersome and too expensive. He also came out against a government which included all three parties represented in parliament which occupies the No 2 slot on the popularity scale in the polls. But he said he would be willing to talk about forming a small coalition including the SPÖ and the FPÖ. The fact that only 8 percent of all Austrians appear to favor such a coalition leaves Kreisky just as cold as protests against it, arising within his own party.

There have also been protests by the public and the rank-and-file of his own party over Kreisky's brushing aside the results of the greatest popular referendum in Austrian history. Although 26 percent of all eligible voters signed the appeal against construction of a huge conference center next to Vienna's U.N. city, Kreisky ordered that major contracts be let and that work on the huge project be begun immediately even before parliament had an oppor-

tunity to deal with the referendum issue. When the parliament will begin discussion on the referendum as provided for by the constitution sometime soon, it will already be too late to order a halt to construction. The major contracts have already been let.

Bruno Kreisky may be right in thinking that he can get away with a lot at this time which no other politician in Austria would be permitted to do. His own party is prepared to do just about anything to hold on to him as chancellor and head of the party. Therefore, there is no need for him to take criticism within the party seriously—even if it is voiced frequently and vehemently on the sly. But it is another question whether the Socialist Party will continue to identify with Kreisky, if it does not attain its goal of winning more than 50 percent of the vote in May 1983 with Kreisky as its standard bearer and with his help.

9478

CSO: 3103/683

## STOLTENBERG ON CDU'S POLITICAL, ECONOMIC STRATEGY

Bonn DIE WELT in German 7 Aug 82 p 3

[Interview with Schleswig-Holstein Minister President Gerhard Stoltenberg; interview conducted by Wilfried Hertz-Eichenrode, date and place of interview not given]

[Text] [Question] Herr Minister President, were you surprised that Helmut Kohl fed the discussion of the choice of candidates by publicly declaring his own candidacy for the position of Federal Chancellor in the event that the question should become acute during this legislative period?

[Answer] The interview with Helmut Kohl that you mention was within the framework of what had been discussed in the CDU executive council.

[Question] His public announcement has been interpreted as a reaction to reports that the North German CDU--such names as Albrecht, Koep, von Weis-saecker and Stoltenberg had been mentioned--had moved to prevent Helmut Kohl's candidacy. Is there any truth to these reports?

[Answer] The chronic crisis of the Bonn coalition has led to an ever growing number of speculations, some of which are also going to affect the CDU/CSU. In recent weeks there have also been reports of rivalries between Ernst Albrecht and myself as well as reports of joint secret plans to replace Helmut Kohl with him or others. The one story is as far from the truth as the other.

[Question] How do things stand within the party with respect to candidacies?

[Answer] It was last summer that we once again affirmed the resolutions of the CDU executive council to carry out the basic discussion of platform and candidacies for the 1984 Bundestag elections in the spring of 1983, after the series of Landtag elections. I am assuming that all responsible political leaders of the CDU will continue to abide by this legitimate decision. There is nothing that we can do to prevent others from writing, often with very transparent motives, whatever they please about prominent CDU politicians and the question of candidacy for the office of chancellor. But after what we went through before the Bundestag elections of 1976 and 1980, we were well advised not to be upset by this and to stick to our agreements. We learned our lessons from those years.

[Question] Has any particular level of discussions been reached within the North German CDU?

[Answer] For some 15 years we have, in North Germany, kept in very close touch with the regional party organizations. We meet from time to time without any formal institutional structure. As far as questions of Federal policy are concerned, we do our deliberation within the activity of the national executive council and the national executive committee. This is a proper and politically defensible principle that we have held fast to.

[Question] Assuming that a change of government with Kohl as Federal Chancellor were to come to pass during this legislative period: can we further assume that the Union is prepared, during its first 100 days in office, to put forward convincing policy guidelines that would lead the way out of the present economic crisis?

[Answer] Our 1980 campaign platform has proved to be correct on all points with respect to the political, economic and fiscal developments of recent years. In any case, the worsening of the economic situation, the disruption of public finances and the social security system have been so drastic that we will have to continue to carry out our efforts under these much less promising conditions. A number of things have been undertaken over the past 2 years, but a great deal more remains to be done.

[Question] What kinds of things still remain to be done?

[Answer] Our most pressing task is to win the upcoming Landtag elections--from September through March in four Bundeslaender--and especially to intensify the programmatic image of the CDU/CSU to such a degree that the current demographic majorities, as shown in the polls, will lead to a parliamentary majority. What is decisive is that we come to a deeper political analysis of the basic currents and expectations of our time--beyond the famous Sunday question.

[Question] What does that look like in terms of schedule?

[Answer] We have to look at three stages of development--in 1983 we want to conclude the platform and candidacy decisions for the 1984 Bundestag election;

--in the coming campaign it will be a question of winning the new majority in the Parliament;

--a new government, whether it be a parliamentary majority of the CDU/CSU or in a coalition with the FDP, will then have to carry out this policy. And executing policy no longer means simply gaining majorities in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, but also being able to convince people.

[Question] Convincing them that sacrifices have to be made?

[Answer] No recovery policy can avoid painful corrections and intrusions into existing legally held assets. We can see from the example of other Western European countries--Great Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands--how difficult it is to restore health to economic and fiscal foundations once they have been badly disrupted. I am convinced that we will find the political strength to do this. But that is the real test.

[Question] Why hasn't the Union given proof of the strength of its ability to convince the voters already?

[Answer] In any case, if you look at the three stages of which I spoke, there is no reason, for the sake of the first decision that will have to be made next year, to open up wounds that will only have to be sewn up again later. To find credible political answers to the concerns and anxieties of people, to bolster confidence and private initiative and thus lay the foundations for a new vision of things, this is the most pressing task of the Union.

[Question] You don't believe then that the coalition is going to collapse?

[Answer] Of course we have to be prepared for sudden changes; but I still don't think that this is likely, because the inner polarisation in the FDP is growing ever stronger. Its Left wing has until now been able to immobilize those members who even last summer had good reason for seeking a change.

[Question] Do you think that the Federal Chancellor--true to the pattern set by Konrad Adenauer--will try to split the FDP so as to stay in power?

[Answer] The chancellor has used the leading representatives of the Left wing in a very evident way to counter those who want a switch.

[Question] Is that an attempt to stem the domestic change of political feeling?

[Answer] The ground swell of the German population is running against the Social Democrats. Their disappointment is great and this does not result just from the current economic crisis and the frightening level of unemployment. You can recognize a very real sobering up process, because the great promises of the 1970's did not lead to the results that were hoped for. But despite the serious intellectual and political crisis of the German Left, Schmidt is still a very formidable opponent. It is possible that the chronic crisis of the coalition could last until 1984. It is also possible that with some slight improvement in the economy during 1983/84 that the Social Democrats could once again unleash a great propaganda offensive in which they would definitely use the peace theme and foreign policy issues as they did in 1980 for a demagogic campaign fight. The Union's chances of coming back into power have never been so good since 1969, but until then it is not going to be a Sunday stroll.

[Question] Is the FDP in its present condition still a desirable coalition partner for the Union or would you advise your party to place its bets on its own absolute majority?

[Answer] Any major party, which can count on more than 50 percent of the voters in current opinion polls, is naturally going to strive for a majority. This holds true for the coming Landtag elections as well as for the Bundestag election. But we can see something like a four-party system being established over the next few years. The Greens and the Alternatives have a chance of being represented in the next Bundestag. That is why it would be foolish to rule out the possibility of cooperation with the FDP.

[Question] Quite concretely--what are the issues now?

[Answer] Responsible politicians of all parties represented in the Bundestag, when they don't have to deal with pressing issues of the moment, are saying that a change of trend in private and public investments has to come to pass, that the recovery of our economy is going to demand a substantially greater share of our gross national product than we are currently allocating. There will be no way of avoiding intrusions into the laws of efficiency. This will affect the property rights of individuals. But the recognition is gaining ground that these legal structures which were created during the years of economic growth and growth illusions can no longer be financed. What will be more important than the scale of the next social security cost of living adjustment will be for working people to be convinced that the recovery of the economy and the fight against unemployment must have absolute priority and that the fiscal foundations of old age and health insurance must once again be put in order.

[Question] The Union and the Trade Union Federation (DGB) are in the unusual position of both of them making common cause in rejecting what has been called the "social imbalance" of the government's resolutions for the 1983 budget. Does a common cause really exist if the issue is stimulating the economy and overcoming unemployment?

[Answer] The fact that many workers have turned away from the SPD has also had its impact in the trade unions. It is only right that we look to expand the areas of agreement and to make people more conscious of them. For years now these have existed in the controversy surrounding energy policy; there are opportunities for a widespread agreement in the case of an active policy in support of the formation of individual capital assets, which is something very important. But there will also probably be differences of perception between a CDU/CSU government and the trade unions. Yet I see a good chance of avoiding what many people fear would be a total confrontation.

[Question] Would you advise a chancellor from the Union to make his peace with the trade unions by giving legal guarantees for the continued existence of the co-determination policy of the coal and steel industries or even to extend it to other sectors of the economy?

[Answer] On this question of co-determination there are substantial differences between employers and labor. In my opinion it is not one of the top priorities of a CDU/CSU government to alter the existing legal situation--neither in the one direction or the other.

[Question] Are you assuming that after the summer recess that the Federal Government's resolutions on the 1983 budget will have to be renegotiated, since the economic performance data that were used no longer hold true?

[Answer] Yes, that will be unavoidable. It's now only a question of tactics when this will take place. The sooner the Federal Government sees what has to be done, the better.

[Question] There has been angry criticism from SPD-governed Laender of the Federal Government's budget resolutions. What chance does the Federal Government have of being able to get its budget resolutions through the Bundesrat?

[Answer] At the end of August we want to review, within the circle of CDU/CSU governed Laender and the Bundestag fraction, our assessment of individual bills once again and very carefully before the actual voting process begins in September. I personally don't think that there will be large areas of contention on such modest points as patient participation in hospitalization or sanatorium costs. Socially acceptable forms of patient cost-sharing are going to be unavoidable within the framework of cost cutting and the reconstitution of our social security system.

[Question] Yet that is exactly the issue which is driving Boerner [SPD Minister President of Hesse] to the barricades.

[Answer] Well, we are of different opinions on that point.

[Question] It's also what is driving the trade unions to the barricades.

[Answer] Apart from the issue of its practicability, I can't see, in principle, any point of contention there. Certain tax proposals have to be looked at more critically. The process of increasing taxes by eliminating tax exemptions will be continued. There are, however, serious constitutional objections to limitations on splitting by married couples.

[Question] In the meantime, massive resistance on the part of the trade unions to the government's tax proposals has been building up. Are you assuming that the Federal Chancellor won't be able to carry out any further cuts in the social safety net and that tax increases will be rejected in the Bundesrat? Is the only alternative left to the chancellor an increase in Federal indebtedness?

[Answer] I'm afraid that this is what he has in mind. But I can tell you quite frankly: the restoration of public finances and reallocation of resources to investment and employment can't be done in the legislative form that we have just been talking about. Any new government will have to present an overall plan which will effectively institute a recovery process in carefully designed stages with its effects spread over the next few years. The difficulties of proposing in October even more significant economy measures for 1983 reside in the fact that these could hardly be put into effect before 1 January. This haste and shortwindedness is the worst thing about the political process in Bonn.

9878

CSO: 3130/645



## ANALYSIS OF PEACE MOVEMENT, SOVIET INFLUENCE

Hamburg AUSSENPOLITIK in German No 3 1982 pp 211-224

[Article by Gerhard Wettig: "The New Peace Movement in Germany"]

[Text] The new peace movement in the FRG can be seen as an alternative culture and also as a piece of a cultural crisis. It is basing its fanaticism of purity on moral grounds and turning away from politics which in its opinion has been compromised. Dr Gerhard Wettig of the FRG Institute for Eastern Scientific and International Studies in Cologne proceeds from this basic assumption for the analysis of a movement which is seeking the abandonment of the values of the industrial production society and turning to new values of self-development. It follows that with respect to the security policy, the peace-threatening effects of deterrence are singled out and contrasted with the peace-guaranteeing effects of detente or the abandonment of armament; consequently members of this movement are no longer accessible to categories of political ideas and reject any ability for compromise and tolerance. Thus, the central question is no longer the objective connection which is important for interstate relations. In their opinion, being expected to consider international conditions as a criterion for their decisions is an imposition. Preventing war and preserving peace by using the means of deterrence is identical with preparation for war, without taking into consideration the experiences of the last decades. Of course, such a movement meets the interests of the Soviet Union. It does not at all imply, however, that the communists in Germany are identifying with the peace movement. Communist have always rejected the traditional pacifism. Thus, they are also distancing themselves from the peace movement. The apparent commonality is therefore an asymmetry. After all, wherever the rejection of Western means of deterrence can be strengthened, the expansion

of military power in the East is not to be prevented simultaneously. Naturally, as an additional means of Eastern politics, the peace movement is to be utilized and promoted.

#### The Social Location of the Peace Movement

Seen as a whole, there is still a consensus in the West German society in favor of security policies. It has remained constant over the years; 50 percent of the population support a military defense in case of war. Nevertheless, at the same time only 20 percent are in favor of using nuclear weapons on their own territory and 70 percent are opposed to it. This stability of opinion is representative only of those who are more than 25 years old.<sup>1</sup>

Opinions among the young generation, however, are clearly in opposition to the above. Among younger people, agreement with the official security policy is significantly lower. The trend of rejection increases when other social factors are added, school and university education as well as living in heavily populated areas. Particularly noticeable is the negative correlation between the length of staying in school and at institutions of higher learning and the agreement with government politics. Richard Loewenthal is talking about a critical youth which is emerging from the "new" social levels and which wants to retreat from the industrial society built on division of labor, and he blames the teachers who are the product of the protest movement of the late 1960's, saying that they are in large part responsible because they had resigned from assuming their social tasks of education. He also blames many pastors because they had neglected their social responsibilities over their concern for saving endangered souls.<sup>2</sup>

Still, it is likely that these influences have been overestimated. There are also other possible explanations. Some time ago a Mannheim study on the ideas on the security policy among West German leadership groups led to results, according to which different factors are cited for the preservation of peace and they vary depending on the group. Whereas parties and ministries almost exclusively consider the policy of deterrence as the basis of peace, at universities detente is seen as the most decisive guarantee for peace and security.<sup>3</sup> This finding leads to the conclusion that those young people who are most intensively exposed to the influence of institutions of higher learning and their instructors accept the academic prejudice about the peace-guaranteeing effect of detente and the peace-endangering effects of deterrence. This group is also unique because it lacks occupational and social independence for a longer period of life and its members exhibit an abstract-ideal manner of thinking and an existential distance from society.

#### Various Trends in the Peace Movement

It is altogether impossible to make generally valid statements about the peace movement. The tendencies that converge are too different. In contrast to the

traditional pacifism and to earlier trends opposed to armament--for instance, the "without me" movement of the early to middle 1950's or the later "anti-nuclear-death" group--the peace movement of the early 1980's absorbed an absolutely bewildering "variety of ideas." Their supporters extend "from absolute pacifists to those who consider 'social defense' and those whose protest is primarily directed at nuclear weapons, furthermore to those who in principle are not opposed to the NATO strategy of balance, not to mention those, finally, who are engaged in pursuing the goals of the other side."<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, there is a unifying bond: resistance against the eurostrategic counterarming of NATO. For the purposes of analysis it is necessary to establish an exact differentiation of motives and views.

First of all, there is an opposition of a pragmatic character. Many people in the FRG feel that current armament efforts are adequate to fulfill the purpose of deterring war. They do not understand that now, following a long period of guaranteed security for the West without any problems, it should be necessary to institute sensational defense efforts. Sometimes they even think in the categories of the overkill: If NATO is already able to destroy its potential enemies several times with its nuclear weapons, it should not be necessary to create additional destruction capacities.

Others have been convinced that planned eurostrategic counterarming in West Europe is creating possibilities of conducting nuclear war on the European theater. It places the countries of the old continent in mortal danger, which must be resisted. Such fears are occasionally crystallized in the U.S. strategy of "flexible response." The fact that the United States would initially consider a limited military reaction in case the policy of deterrence should fail, is incorrectly interpreted as a desire to conduct a limited war, particularly a European nuclear war. The protest is understandable which is directed against this alleged "europeanization of the risk," which would radically endanger the human existence in Central Europe.

The threshold of the transition from a pragmatic opposition to one based on principles is occupied by those who reject the Western deterrence policy because it leads to an arms race between East and West and leaves no chance for arms control efforts. From this view, NATO's comments which are aimed at cooperative arms control are seen as nothing but propaganda exercises. Others feel that the deterrence policy is doomed to failure as an attempt to subject the danger of war to a rational control. From this perspective it would also no longer suffice in case there should be decisive progress in arms control, because in this manner no reliable protection against the possibility of a war between East and West can be won. Instead measures for building political confidence and/or steps for unilateral disarmament are considered indispensable.

At this point a "new security-policy morale" is beginning to take shape: From the ethical point of view it is imperative to relinquish any kind of security

policy which is based on the availability of the means of mass destruction and/or threatens the potential enemy in case of war with unacceptably extensive destruction. The result is the idea of an "alternative defense," according to which the defense against the enemy--in case he should penetrate West German territory--must exclusively take place with conventional means and only with defensively deployable weapons and military techniques.<sup>6</sup>

The official security policy is attacked in the most radical manner by those who want to avoid the use of military instruments from the very beginning and under all circumstances. The slogan is accordingly: "Living without armament." The issue is no longer merely an "alternative defense" but an "alternative security" in general. Ideas are vague, as a rule, as to how such a concept could be realized. Most of the time it appears that it is simply the faith that the USSR and its allies would be more than happy on their part to abandon the "insanity" of arms buildup and renounce all expansive or aggressive actions against Western countries if they received a firm guarantee for the absence of any military threat. A more differentiating concept by the originators of the program "Creating peace without weapons" amounts to a unilateral limited disarmament initiative of the West to enable the Eastern states to join a process of reciprocal reduction of armed forces.

Most of the time individual psychological considerations are applied to justify such expectations. Occasionally there is also a glimmer of conviction that a "socialist" order--like the one existing in the Warsaw Pact states--is of necessity coupled with a peaceful attitude. It appears that will to power and competition for power, inclination to power and success through power are not at all a serious topic for consideration among the majority of supporters of nonarmament. Only a minority is mentioning the fact that nonmilitary efforts for security from the USSR, for instance, through precautionary measures of a "social defense," should take the place of past and current concepts.<sup>7</sup> Any discussion of neutrality is conspicuously rare.

Regardless of the difference in ideas concerning procedures and goals, many supporters of the new peace movement have in common certain trends and a number of views. Peter Graf Kielmannsegg called attention to the fact that in the consciousness of these pacifists the USSR is "not really present" as a potential enemy. To be sure, the Soviet Union is mentioned now and then, but there is no realization of its power potential, its order of domination and the orientation of its will. It is particularly evident from the fact that there is no attempt to answer any questions that arise in Western countries concerning this matter. The fact of the SS-20 buildup, for instance, is practically ignored: The thought does not even arise that it could present a threat to West Europe. Correspondingly Peter Graf Kielmannsegg is identifying an "introversion of the peace movement." In its opinion the important thing is that the West relinquishes the logic of balance in a singly act of self-liberation--and, to be sure, it must be done unconditionally and

irrevocably.<sup>8</sup> Disarmament is more or less a value in itself, the realization of which is considered important for the progress of peace, even if it is only carried out unilaterally.<sup>9</sup>

#### Prerequisites for Its Development

Many different prerequisites had to converge before all the different forces could form one movement able to act as a unit. No doubt, counterarming fulfilled a catalytic function in this respect. The motives, however, go much deeper. Among the fundamental facets is the widespread realization in the FRG that in a nuclear age only peace can guarantee the survival of the country and that a war on German soil would be a threat to its existence in any form. In addition there is the annoyance over the logic of deterrence: To avoid war it is considered necessary to prepare for war--and what makes it worse is that it has to be in the particularly horrible nuclear realm, which carries within itself total annihilation. The human perception rejects the inherent paradox. Particularly in the FRG, which in case of a war would practically have no hope of survival, it is becoming more and more difficult to base a consensus on the security policy on the logic of deterrence, which seems absurd.<sup>10</sup>

Because of their unique situation since World War II, the West Germans have had a broken relationship with the idea of defense. At the outbreak of any East-West war their country would be from the first moment on the scene of an unimaginable destruction. In view of the operative defensive position of NATO, the forward defense that had been demanded by Kurt Schumacher and others during the 1950's and which was to shift rapidly war activities from the German soil to the East, has become nothing more but a forward-based defense. Nobody knows whether in a case of emergency it would remain intact or whether one should count on a movement of the fronts toward the West at the expense of the FRG.

The members of the Western Alliance are trying to solve the problem of their uncertain defense capabilities by capitalizing on the prevention of war and they try to achieve this goal, among other things, by announcing that if need be, a nuclear escalation would force the enemy to stop an attack. Among the West German public, however, this theory is often interpreted as the explanation of U.S. willingness to conduct war, which arouses additional fears. Consequently, a repeatedly devastated FRG is considered a concrete possibility. The vision of horror is intensified by the fact that the means of destruction are exclusively in the hands of foreign politicians, for whom Germany does not represent the value of a homeland. It is a completely different situation from the one in France and in the United Kingdom, where the critics know that the weapons of deterrence are in the hands and the power of their own people; consequently they are more easily convinced that their use would only take place in the interest of their own survival. Thus, nuclear weapons do not have any stabilizing functions in the FRG when it comes to domestic policy, as is

the case of the force de frappe in France. Instead, the suspicion that one has to accept peace or war at the discretion of a foreign power favors the tendency of fleeing from the realities of Central Europe's security policy.

Furthermore, a special situation at the beginning of the 1980's contributed significantly to the establishment and the growth of the peace movement. For a large segment of the West German public, the policy of detente of the preceding decade apparently provided adequate guarantees for the security of the country. In view of the widespread detente optimism there was little apprehension about the fact that the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states were continuing their arms buildup unabatedly, while NATO let its military efforts stagnate and even curtailed it (i.e. if it was even noticed).

The majority of the West Germans gradually became accustomed to the growing imbalance on the European theater. When NATO--beginning with 1978--started to press for an energetic Western countereffort and the United States--beginning with 1980--started its attempt to catch up with the Soviet lead by dramatically increasing its arms buildup, many citizens in the FRG got the impression of suddenly appearing military power politics, unprovoked by similar sensational steps on the part of the USSR. The past neglect of the military balance of power by the United States and its allies turned into an argument which cast doubts on the necessity of a suddenly introduced counterarming. The continuity with which the Soviet leadership followed the postulate of a military increase in power since the early 1960's, regardless of Western opinions, now paid off psychologically.

Various accompanying circumstances intensified the problem. Already at the end of the 1970's, the U.S. trend toward turning away from the arms-control policy met with West German concern. The efforts by both world powers to come to arms-control agreements had an important symbolic function for a large segment of the public in the FRG. They felt that because of it the feared war had become improbable. As a consequence, the FRG went into shock when it became clear that the Senate in Washington was not going to ratify the SALT II Treaty which had been concluded in 1979. Many people no longer believed that the U.S. security policy was aimed at preventing war and preserving peace. This negative effect was intensified when Reagan won the presidential election with slogans of military strength and a rhetoric that emphasized the ability of conducting a war and when he continued to speak in the same manner after he assumed his office of leadership. Statements of that kind, the domestic American context of which has generally remained completely incomprehensible to the West German public, became more or less crystallization factors of a spreading concern for peace. At the same time, those who had already taken a position against Bonn's security policy found welcome proof for their actions.

## Alternative Culture, a Partially Fertile Soil

An essential new factor which differentiates the peace movement of the early 1980's from earlier movements of protest against the official security policy is the appearance among their ranks of an "alternative-cultural type." It can be found most of all among the youthful supporters of the peace movement, although the articulations of its self-evidence--as long as they are of a systematic-theoretical character--stem almost exclusively from mostly aged "fathers." Statements from this group, however, occasionally are also misleading. They do not correspond in all points to the empirically evident views among the youth. It applies particularly to questions of national concern. The leftwing nationalist motivation, which is displayed by some "fathers," has no equivalent among the alternative youth. The "alternative-culture type" is only one of several elements in the peace movement. Nevertheless, it must be viewed as a strong nucleus which, moreover, cannot be influenced easily through rational argumentations.

A study by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Kruse / Lehnert / Scherer 1980) on the political views of students at five West German universities clearly shows a fundamental opposition potential. Accordingly, 10 percent can be classified as leftwing opponents of the parliamentary system. In addition, subjectively every fourth student feels that he belongs more or less to the alternative culture. Of course, barely 12 percent of the alternative culture can objectively be totally included. Of interest is the sociological background of the "alternative-culture type." For the most part he comes from a family environment that shows a definite lack of socialization. According to the conclusion, the members of the alternative culture are recruited primarily from the middle class. The fact that no firm values have been transmitted to them increases the susceptibility to new sociocultural orientations.<sup>11</sup>

A look at the alternative scene reveals signs of a general cultural crisis. The protest goes beyond the "deprivation of ideas," which occurred also in earlier young generations as a result of comparing the existing reality with learned theories and values; a consequence, above all, is the present trend of moral arrogance toward political "makers" which has developed. Politics is generally considered as something that has been compromised because it does not measure up to the scientific ideal of rationality evident in strict logic, pure understanding and noncontroversial results. A very knowledgeable observer is simultaneously talking about a cognitive and moralizing purity fanaticism. It follows that it looks upon a conflict with different opinions, the discipline of factual argumentation and the willingness for tolerance as an abomination. It is joined by a hedonistic attitude, which demands that every action is a fulfillment of pleasure and therefore it shuns the frustrations of long-term efforts. There is more: "Body politics" is the primary concern, and the crucial criterion of evidence is the physical-psychic effect. "Politics promoting well-being is in demand." Accordingly political discussions are no

longer combined with the postulate of desiring to gain knowledge but the challenge: "Get involved!" It is important "to listen...to the 'arguments' of the stomach and the emotions."<sup>12</sup> Another observer who is in agreement mentions an "expansion of the subjective."<sup>13</sup>

Often therapeutic efforts take the place of arguments related to discussions. During a public address at the Protestant lay conference in the summer of 1980, Heinrich Albertz appealed to Chancellor Schmidt: "Accept the peace movement. It wants to help you...I believe you when you say that you are trying everything to prevent the worst....Speak openly about your obligations. We are, when it gets serious, an occupied country."<sup>14</sup> From the very beginning this encouragement does not give the person spoken to an opportunity to express a different opinion. He is addressed like a stubborn child or a patient, being told that he should "accept" the peace movement for his own salvation. Because his actions seem to call for an unequivocal repudiation, Schmidt needs a pardoning hint, at least he had tried "to prevent the worst" and that he was subject to the influence of evil external "obligations"--from which he should now free himself by means of open discussion. But preceding any discussion, he is denied any kind of subjective responsibility and objective justification; consequently his salvation can only consist of repudiating his past actions and following the demands of his adversaries. This kind of address logically resulted--to the great surprise of Albertz--in serious disruptions in communications with the chancellor.

A rejection of the values of the industrial production society and an embrace of the new values of self-development are indicative of the alternative-cultural milieu. The basic material needs seem to be guaranteed. It is combined with a striking sensitivity to the growing social and psychic problems which have resulted from the material improvements. An extraordinarily frustrating realization is the fact that the educational reforms of the 1960's and 1970's did not provide the promised cultural gains and social improvements by eliminating all differences and that instead, because of greater accessibility to secondary schools and colleges, the selection and competition has become more pronounced.

A direction of economic growth which does not consider nature and the environment and which, as a result, gradually destroys the foundations of human life leads to emotional perplexity. Whatever threatens future living conditions is already beginning to restrict our present existence, as is evident from the increasing pollution of air, water and soil, the poisoning of food which has been established, the imminent destruction of forests and lakes, the spreading extermination of the animal and plant world and the decline in health and life-span expectations for human beings. A bureaucratic megalomania, which is destroying established social units and replacing them with impersonal, mass agglomerations of vast proportions, is intensifying the feeling of a critical situation. In addition a deep-seated alienation exists between responsible



politicians and large segments of the population that are not tied to party politics. A crucial factor is the more or less inhuman, ruinous extent of encumbrances that politicians have to contend with while doing their work as well as during hasty, superficial meetings with the public. Because of objectively existing obligations there is rarely time or energy for genuine contacts and dialogue with the grass roots, unless they represent the specific interests of party activities.

All these factors have far-reaching effects on the alternative-cultural circles of society. There is a widespread feeling in these circles that they do not have anything in common any more with the politics and the "system" which they represent. It can go so far that whoever is even trying to talk with "those" in Bonn is already considered an enemy. Just as much there is often evidence of a drop-out mentality which prohibits any arguments over facts with those who think differently. Beyond that: The principle of rationality itself is frequently questioned. They say, for instance, that it is no longer possible to discuss rationally "in a narrow-minded manner," as if one could continue forever what has been practiced to date. The criterion is raised that rationality is nothing but "sham rationality."

Behind it, among other things, is the demand that the future should be given more importance than the present moment. After all, one could not talk and act as if there were not any challenges reflecting a worldwide threat of an environmental catastrophe, the material misery in the developing countries and the feared failure of war-prevention strategies, which could happen sooner or later. Whoever is in favor of deterrence and proceeds from the nonuse of available weapons lacks credibility from the very beginning and is suspected of consciously accepting the horrors of a future war. In part it is based on the idea that in the end rational calculations could not function.

As far as the representatives of the alternative culture are concerned, the central question of the peace problem is not the objective connection which is significant for interstate relations. They feel that it is more or less an unbearable imposition to expect them to make international conditions a criterion for their decision. Being forced to accept this perspective, prejudices a wrong concept of power. The important thing is to put the emotional needs of man in the center; to date they have been ignored. Accordingly psychotherapeutic aspects play a major role in this world of ideas: Insights of psychotherapy are transferred directly to international conditions.<sup>15</sup> Representatives of psychotherapy have an extraordinary interest in the peace movement. As essential basic orientation was supplied by Erich Fromm with his alternative of to be or to have and by Alexander Lowen and the opposing pair of desire or power.

It is no accident that the challenging profession of their own fear (of war) by the members of the peace movement has more or less become a ritual commandment.

Whereas traditionally, fear for one's own self has been shameful and it is dangerous toward the outside world--a reason why it must be fought vigorously--therapeutic practice has come up with a different insight: One's own fear cannot be overcome by fighting it intensely, but it loses much of its burdensome effects after one has become conscious of it and admitted it to oneself. This logic is applied to the interstate reality: The only thing that needs to be done is overcoming one's own fears; it will dissipate upon professing it.

Such considerations show that in the alternative world of ideas there is not only no room for categories of thoughts that relate to the use of force but there is also no room for the use of power in general. In other words, it is out of the question that the leaders of states could have anything else in mind but to relieve their own fears which are caused by living together internationally--particularly in view of the armament processes. Typical for this kind of attitude is the view that the system of reciprocal deterrence is leading to nothing else but a 'nuclearly resolved despair.' It is significant that an attempt is being made to refute the official security policy psychologically through an analysis of the fear for their lives felt among its supporters.<sup>16</sup> There is counterproof to the hypothesis of the positive correlation between the psychotherapeutic apolitical attitude and the security-policy opposition. It is the fact that among recipients of any kind of foreign-and security-policy information the support for the opinion of the Federal Government is considerably above the average.<sup>17</sup>

#### Influences From the USSR

The Soviet leadership has been preparing for a propagandistic offensive for a long time; its main target is the West German public. The basic thesis--which was established as early as 1970--is the one that Europeans should beware of a limited nuclear war on their continent which was being planned by the United States as a means to achieve world domination.<sup>18</sup> In 1979 this argument was subsequently related to the NATO plan for eurostrategic counter-arming. At the end of the 1970's, Moscow made special organizational preparations to influence effectively public opinion in West Europe and particularly in West Germany. A Department for International Information was established at the CPSU Central Committee, led by prominent experts on Germany, for instance, Leonid Samjatin (as director) and Valentin Falin (as first deputy director). Since then high-caliber "germanists" of the Soviet party apparatus have used the West German media again and again to make known to the West German public the security policy theses of the USSR.

The second channel of Soviet influence takes its course from the CPSU via the West branch of the SED to West German communists and organizations dominated by them. The main goal of the Soviet originators is to reduce existing reservations in the West German peace movement with respect to working together with communists. Consequently Moscow is trying to discredit the view "that

communists and pacifists cannot take the same road." Nevertheless, according to Soviet intentions, communists are not to approach the viewpoints of the peace movement. The "basic communist attitude concerning the pacifist movement" must remain unaffected. In practice it amounts to an effort by communist functionaries to utilize the inclinations and activities of the peace movement; at the same time, however, the USSR must be allowed to continue the unlimited use of military power for its political purposes.

Accordingly the peace movement is criticized for "underestimating the class-related motives of a war" and for "condemning any war without considering its character and its goals." One cannot believe in the "possibilities of preventing a war by conviction alone" and thus limit the options of the "peace struggle" to the exclusive use of nonmilitary means, because under certain conditions it could be to the disadvantage of the "workers" (i.e. the goals established by the USSR). Consequently, "pacifism could naturally not be the 'program of a revolutionary proletarian party,'" which is the reason why communists do "not hide their convictions that a consistent struggle to the end against war requires the liquidation of the foundations which are its cause, especially capitalist private ownership of production means and the social forces which are interested in an aggression against other nations."<sup>19</sup>

Whether the USSR is going to use military or nonmilitary means must depend only on considerations of expediency. A commonness of goals between the peace movement and the communists of Moscow's persuasion can exist only as a pretext. Practically it amounts to an asymmetric relationship. The supporters of the peace movement are to accept USSR partisans as their own. On the other hand, however, the DKP and its member organizations feel that their "basic concept of principles" prevents them from accepting the friends of peace unconditionally. Thus, the joint action planned by Moscow implies that communists unilaterally maintain their distance from the peace movement, i.e. they are to assert their own political identity.

As a consequence the Soviet policy is aimed at exploiting for its own purposes the "solid antiwar potential" that has arisen in West Europe.<sup>20</sup> The "intensifying class struggle" in the European NATO countries is to become as much as possible a "school for the intellectual education and training of the masses" in the Soviet-communist spirit,<sup>21</sup> in other words, it is to initiate an inclusion of West European social forces in the connection of a world movement controlled by the Soviets. During a first phase "broad masses of the population" are to be induced "to join the struggle against war and thus erect a reliable barrier in the path of possible nuclear aggressors." Prospects in this respect seem favorable: "Such a consciousness is already in existence." The second phase consists of spreading through the societies of West Europe "the consciousness of a reciprocal connection between the question of war and peace and the vital interests of all mankind," i.e. the program demands of the CPSU and its dependent communist parties.<sup>22</sup>

In Moscow's opinion, this policy has already produced considerable success. "Under the influence of the countries of socialism, their peace-loving policies and their willingness and ability to firmly resist the aggressive attacks of imperialism (i.e., above all, the United States) a far-reaching change has come about in the distribution of the class forces in the world." The "authority of the leftwing forces has been strengthened, above all, of communist parties" in Western countries.<sup>23</sup> As far as the FRG is concerned, official West German sources have come to a similar conclusion. Under the influence of the DKP and its member organizations (especially the German Peace Union), the "Krefeld Appeal" was formulated, a declaration which unilaterally condemns the eurostrategic arms buildup of NATO; allegedly 2 million signatures were subsequently collected.<sup>24</sup> Simultaneously West German communists, in conjunction with the CPSU and the SED, succeeded in gaining recognition as cofighters in the peace movement, which resulted in a substantial increase in their political influence.<sup>25</sup> In part it is due to the fact that the financial support and the organizational abilities available to Moscow-oriented communists are in short supply in the peace movement, which makes for quite an attraction and thus their effect is substantial.

The Soviet leadership has no intention of reducing its armament efforts because of the successes that have been achieved in West European countries. According to Vadim Sagladin, the functionary responsible for relations with the West in the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee, it would be the biggest mistake Moscow could make. The growth of the peace movement in the West, he declared, is essentially a result of the "growth of the economic and defense potential of socialism." It made "real socialism the most dynamic force of the present," as a consequence its influence is increasing on the "course of the development of the world." It is only natural that--as a parallel--"positions of other antimilitary forces" are being strengthened, for instance, the peace movement and communist allies in Western countries.<sup>22</sup>

## Conclusions

The peace movement of the early 1980's creates problems for the coalition and opposition parties of the German Bundestag that are by far more complex than any of those presented by earlier resistance movements against the Atlantic security policy. The reason is not so much that today segments of the West German society are less likely to isolate themselves politically from Soviet-communist forces in their own country than was customary at an earlier time--although it is a significant factor. The most disquietening component is the fact that the peace movement is increasingly embracing groups of supporters who are generally not accessible to political categories of thought, who judge peace and armament problems exclusively according to some individual-psychotherapeutic criterion and who look upon themselves, compared to political "makers," as the representatives of a morally superior counter-culture.

The danger inherent in this development cannot be dismissed by pointing to a comparably small group of the population, the "Alternatives." What makes it even more important is the fact that the problem is one of qualitative aspects. When substantial segments of the rising educated class--and particularly those who are unusually active--fundamentally reject the major concepts of the existing state and economic system, the future becomes uncertain. The majority of those who continue to be willing to bear and tolerate the existing order will in the long run be exposed to serious complications and temptations because of a qualified and actively involved minority of opponents who resist integration. The United States, for instance, experienced how strong such a pressure can be--it was a less fundamental issue--during the protests against the Vietnam War. The vocal opposition gradually affected the domestic policy structure to such an extent that forces were tied up that were urgently needed in other areas and nothing could be accomplished until the government presented an acceptable solution.

It is not to be expected that the alternative trend will remain a temporary phenomenon. On the contrary: The basic problem, the danger to interhuman structures and natural environmental living conditions through a ruthless mode of industrialization is intensifying continuously. Already today the future is being made unsafe through more and more numerous signs of ecological alarm on a worldwide scale, above all, however, in the densely populated and highly technicalized Central Europe. The possibilities of human life often seem already threatened in the next generation, if current lines of development are continued. Under these circumstances the realization among the rising generation will of necessity become stronger with respect to reasonable politics and an effort to find a solution to existing problems that affect the future of mankind. The long-term continuation of the politico-social order would be in doubt if the rising generation were to associate generally and permanently with the idea that peace can only be guaranteed by rejecting any kind of security policy.

The young people who are still involved in the educational process and who are therefore in a state of "limbo," which frees them from the confines of vocational, economic, social and political realities, most of the time are much more sensitive than their elders to the contradictions and the questionableness within a society (although most of the time they do not have any convincing remedies--because they are further removed from reality). As a consequence, it should be no surprise that the present cultural crisis is reflected strongest among this group, where it also evokes the most pronounced countercultural reactions. The "Alternatives" are against a culture which is strongly materialistic and technological. To be sure, it still guarantees a physical existence to a degree that did not exist to date, but the emotional-interhuman needs and the requirements for long-term ecological living conditions are more or less ignored. Existing "materialistic" values are juxtaposed with other "post-materialistic" values.

A new kind of common culture is sought for the private and the social life. Included is also the moral imperative, according to which the well-fed, rich world of the north can no longer accept the increasing poverty of the south. The future of mankind is to be guaranteed by putting an end to the irresponsible exploitation and destruction of the natural environment. According to the new understanding, the importance of a security policy is to overcome once and for all the absurd view that peace can only be secured by means of maintaining global destruction capabilities, resulting in a continual wasteful arms race. They are fateful political challenges to our society--challenges, however, to which the alternative movement has not yet been able to provide any useful answers.

The security between the states, for instance, presupposes that not only the hypertrophy of the reciprocal arms buildup be eliminated but that the reciprocal options of threat also be made ineffective. It would be very dangerous if instead of a rational solution to the peace and armament problem, idealism removed from reality is combined with the driving force of the motive for environmental protection as a long-term component of the security policy. As a result, the FRG could subsequently slide into the sphere of influence of the USSR, which would not permit political self-determination in crucial questions; it would also not be interested in ecological concerns.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. It is the result of an analysis by Lutz Unterseher of pertinent opinion-poll results (unpublished). Cf. also Dieter Just and Caspar Muelhens, "Zur Wechselbeziehung von Politik und Demoskopie" [On Interrelationships Between Politics and Demography], AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE, supplement to weekly paper DAS PARLAMENT, B 32, 1981, 8 Aug 1981, pp 63-68; "Jeder dritte hofft auf eine Null-Loesung" [Every Third Person Is Hoping for a Zero Solution], DER SPIEGEL, 23 Nov 1981, pp 56-65; Manfred Kuechler, "18 bis 35 + abitur = Aktivgruppe" [18 to 35 plus Secondary School Diploma = Active Group], DER SPIEGEL, 23 Nov 1981, pp 65-70.
2. Richard Loewenthal, "Identitaet und Zukunft der Sozialdemokraten" [Identity and Future of the Social Democrats], DIE ZEIT, 11 Dec 1981.
3. Dietmar Schoessler / Erich Weede, "West German Elite Views on National Security and Foreign Policy Issues," Koenigstein/Taunus, ATHENAEUM, 1978.
4. Peter Graf Kielmannsegg: "Ungehorsam im Namen des Friedens" [Disobedience in the Name of Peace], EVANGELISCHE KOMMENTARE, No 1, 1982, p 17.

5. This opinion was represented, above all, by Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker and Erhard Eppler. Additional information about the dispute in Gerhard Wettich's "Umstrittene Sicherheit, Friedenswahrung und Ruestungsbegrenzung in Europa" Disputed Security, [Preservation of Peace and Arms Limitation in Europe], Berlin (West), Berlin Verlag, 1982, pp. 145-181. The concept amounts to the idea that neither the desire for means of deterring war nor the requirements of a common Western security policy could be considered. Furthermore, the central defense problem of the Western Alliance in Europe--the possible inadequacies of its own forces in case of an attack by the East--is not taken into consideration, which means that the question whether a compensatory escalation option is necessary is out of the question from the very beginning.
  
6. Cf. Horst Afheldt, Christian Potyka, Utz-Peter Reich, Phillip Sonntag, Karl Friedrich von Weizsaecker, "Durch Kriegsverhuetung zum Krieg? Die politischen Aussagen der Weizsaecker-Studie 'Kriegsfolgen und Kriegs-verhuetung'" [War Through Prevention of War? The Political Statements of the Weizsaecker Study 'Consequences and Prevention of War'], Munich, Hanser Verlag, 1972.
  
7. Cf. Theodor Ebert, "Gewaltfreie Aktion--Erfahrungen und Perspektiven [Nonviolent Action--Experiences and Perspectives], FRIEDENSFORSCHUNG--ENTSCHEIDUNGSHILFE GEGEN GEWALT, edited by Manfred Funke, Munich, List Verlag, 1975, pp 215-238.
  
8. Peter Graf Kielmannsegg, loc. cit., p 17.
  
9. The view is based on two premises: 1. There must not exist an expansive imperialism which exploits the weakness of others who are unarmed; 2. the threat for the Warsaw Pact states lies only in the military development of the West (and not in the effectiveness of its politico-economic power of attraction.)
  
10. Cf. Kurt Biedenkopf, "Rueckzug aus der Grenzsituation" [Retreat from the Border Situation], DIE ZEIT, 30 Nov 1981.
  
11. Rendered according to Walter Hornstein: "Jugendproblems, Jugendforschung und politisches Handeln" [Youth Problems, Youth Research and Political Actions], AUS POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE, supplement to weekly paper DAS PARLAMENT, Vol 2, 82, 23 Jan 1982 p 7 f.
  
12. Klaus Hansen. "Der politische Narziss" [The Political Narcissus], MATERIALIEN ZUR POLITISCHEN BILDUNG, No 4, 1981, pp 23-25.
  
13. Juergen August Alt, "Die Expansion des Subjectiven" [The Expansion of the Subjective], MATERIALIEN ZUR POLITISCHEN BILDUNG, No 4, 1981, pp 32-35.

14. Heinrich Albertz, "Blumen fuer Stukenbrock. Biographisches" [Flowers for Stukenbrock. Biographical Materials], Stuttgart, Radius Verlag, 1981, p 281. The thesis that the FRG is actually still subject to an occupation status represents only Albertz' personal opinions.
15. Cf., for instance, the SPIEGEL interview with Horst Eberhard Richter, DER SPIEGEL, 26 Oct 1981, pp 39-46.
16. For instance, Birgit Volmerg / Ute Volmerg / Thomas Leithaeuser, "Aengste und Kriegsangaengste" [Fears and Fears of War], (publication date May/June, 1982, Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt/Main).
17. "Jeder hofft auf eine Null-Loesung" Every Third Person Is Hoping for a Zero Solution , DER SPIEGEL, 25 Nov 1981, p 59.
18. "Mezdunarodnoe kommunisticeskoe dvizenie. Ocerki strategii i taktiki" (= Instructions to the West parties, which were subsequently translated into all appropriate languages, and for all the communist parties tied to the CPSU they became the object of internal party training). Revised by V. V. Zagladin, Moscow, 1970, p 114.
19. Presentation for West German communists by Dr habil V. Kortunow, transmitted through APN (German), 31 Aug 1981. The Soviet leadership rejects the idea explicitly in its country to label "every peace" as "good" and "every war" as "bad" (Marchall N. Ogarkow, "Na Straze mirnogo truda" in KOMMUNIST No 10, 1981, p 99).
20. G. Voroncov, "SSA i Zapadnaja Evropa v usloviach obostrenija mezdunarodnoj obstanovki" in MIROVAJA EKONOMIKA I VESDUNARODNYE OTNOSENIJA No 11, 1981 p 36. For the USSR, however, only one unrestricted maxim exists, according to which all military preparations must be made for the possibility of an East-West war (Marchall Ogarkov, loc. cit. p 90 f).
21. B. Lichacev, "Ob ideologiceskoj bor'be na mezdunarodnoj arene," KOMMUNIST, No 5, 1978, p 63.
22. V. Zaglidin, "Oktjabr', mir, ziznennye interesy celovecestva," MIRAVAJA EKONOMIKA I MEZDUNARODNYE OTNOSENIJA No 11, 1981, p 15.
23. Ibid. p 4. Soviet assessments of the West European peace movement and its entire political weight can be found in D. Proektor, "Razmyslenia o mire v Evrope," KOMMUNIST, No 15, 1981 p 94 f and in V. Saposnikov, "O nekotorych problemach sovremennogo dvizenija," MIROVAJA EKONOMIKA I MEZDUNARODNYE OTNOSENIJA No 12, 1981, pp 19-29.



24. Cf., among others, the documents in BEITRAEGE ZUR KONFLIKTFORSCHUNG, No 2, 1981, pp 118-149 as well as the information in DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, Printed Matter, No 9/466, 22 May 1981; Martin Singer, "Warum das Krefelder Appell nur auf die NATO zielt" [Why the Krefeld Appeal Is Only Directed at NATO], DIE WELT, 19 Jun 1981; Ernst Guenter Vetter, "Im Notfall mit den Kommunisten" [If Need Be, With the Communists], FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 30 Jun 1981. It is not clear how the 2 million signatures mentioned by the DFU and the DKP came about. Everything seems to indicate that all the members of many organizations that appear as signatories have been included in the count. Apparently the withdrawal of many signatures was not taken into consideration.
25. Cf. concerns "Verfassungsschutz 1980" [Constitutional Protection], edited by the FRG minister of the interior, Bonn, September 1981, pp 52, 68, 73, 87 f, 89; comment by Richard Meier, president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, summarized in "DKP aktiv bei Besetzung von Hausern" [DKP Active During Occupation of Houses], KOELNER STADT ANZEIGER, 16/17 Jan 1982.
26. V. Zagladin, loc. cit. (footnote No 22), p 4.

8991

CSO: 3103/654

## KKE-INT. ANNOUNCEMENT ON NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

Athens I AVGI in Greek 27 Aug 82 p 1

/Text/ The Executive Bureau of the KKE-Interior Central Committee issued the following statement with regard to the "economic policy framework" presented by the Finance Minister Ger. Arsenis:

With the economic policy framework announced by the finance minister, the government after a period of vacillation entered a more sound direction for overcoming the crisis: it focuses on investment, increased production and productivity and changes in the economic structure. It gives priority to the public sector while it says that the government's goal is to place the production system under social control in the framework of a mixed economy free of the negative influence of monopolies. It recognizes that capital should have a significant role, provided it undertakes business initiatives in the context of its development targets. The specific measures are announced for this purpose.

It has been clearly stated that the resources for the necessary investments will not come out of the suppression of workers' incomes. On the other hand, it was declared that there will be a policy for the protection of salaries and wages from inflation. But to implement this declaration in practice, it is necessary to improve, generalize and institutionalize by law the automatic cost-of-living adjustment so that it will embrace all working people. It must also be a democratic reform of taxation to draw the necessary revenues from the higher incomes.

The government, considering the development options far from easy, is seeking a climate of cooperation among the "productive classes," a dialogue with them and the workers' active participation and support.

But the economic policy being outlined cannot be realized without a clash with the big interests that will be hurt. Already we can see the signs of undermining. The capitalists who until recently were acting without control will not accept without resistance the imposition of social controls. In this context, the working people will carry the main burden of this policy for getting out of the crisis. But although this is being acknowledged in yesterday's statements, the proper conditions are not created.

With the exception of law 1264/82 on syndicalism which, with the known omissions and retreats, covered only some of the main demands of the working people, nothing

has yet been done at the institutional level. More specifically, nothing has been done to introduce forms of participation and democratic control of the working people in decision-making.

The necessary increase of productivity in the public sector cannot be achieved without the essential participation of the working people. The income policy considered by the government as being necessary cannot be acceptable except after essential negotiations with the genuine representatives of the working people. The preservation of law 3239/55, the policy followed until now, but also expressions in yesterday's statements, such as: "We will not tolerate undermining... and an abuse of right" or references to "small minorities inspired by other motives" show that the government does not seem to understand the need to gain the cooperation of the working people. The self-management mentioned in the statements appears to be a possible solution for very few cases without having even specified its meaning.

They again propose supervisory boards, but their authority and composition remain vague--and therefore it is possible to degenerate into "consultative" organs without any power.

Finally, the 5-year program for economic development is being prepared without the actual participation of the working people. Unless these conditions change radically the social control will remain without meaning and the entire policy for getting out of the crisis will not be realized.

It is a matter for the working people today, while an economic policy is charted with a series of sound directions, to claim decisively and to play the role that is theirs: to work out their own theses, from the individual enterprise to the national level for the great problem of development and on this basis to direct their own fighting intervention.

7520

CSO: 4621/437

## KKE-INT. COMMUNIQUE ON PRESS CRISIS

Athens I AVGI in Greek 29 Aug 82 p 1

Text The Executive Bureau of the KKE-Interior Central Committee in an announcement issued yesterday underlines that the press crisis is a crucial political problem for democracy in our country. This crisis--it noted--is not strictly economic and entrepreneurial. Because "it does not matter if it appears as a crisis stemming from the inability of the opinion newspapers to cope with the increased publishing costs, expand their circulation, take advantage of the technological and informational progress; in the last analysis it is a crisis of the very press system and of information in general--a political crisis, a crisis of values and institutions."

The communique further emphasizes that the governments of the Right are basically responsible because of their policies, their favors and loans which strengthened the tendencies toward monopolies in the press and its dependence on the intentions of the various governments. It adds that:

"The PASOK government has not charted so far its own policy on press questions. The approach of 'improving accounting' and 'banking criteria' which sees the press as a commodity will benefit only the capitalist newspaper conglomerates." "This approach," it does on, "does not help the establishment of sound conditions and therefore stable finances for the publication of newspapers that express all existing political tendencies. It is contrary to the institutional character of the press, to the constitutional commands for many voices, and the democratic and socialist logic."

KKE-Int. underlines that the press, the freedom of the press, the variety of voices in informing the public are "the foundations of democracy, a significant lever in the struggle for democratic renewal and the change of society." It calls for institutionalizing the strengthening of the opinion press "which expresses in the area of information what the political parties express in the country's political and parliamentary life."

The PASOK government, according to the announcement, should take specific steps to assure the autonomy of the newspapers. "The basic goal must be the democratization of conditions and the equality of terms in their publication."

Finally, the party of communist renewal calls for a special commission to work on a draft law on the press, composed of representatives from the government, the parties, the General Confederation of Labor, and above all the representatives of the press. It also calls for dealing, in the same logic, with the problem of the state controlled mass media.

All partisan forces--the announcement concludes--by contributing to the circulation of AVGI will be fighting at the same time for the freedom and autonomy of the press and for the variety of opinion.

7520

CSO: 4621/437

## GONZALEZ WORKING TO OPEN PSOE WITHOUT GIVING UP REAL POWERS

Madrid ABC in Spanish 25 Aug 82 p 20

[Text] Madrid (M. Bernal)--It is predicted that one of the most important results of the organizational rejuvenation which the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] has begun--which will culminate in a conference during the month of October--will be the strengthening of internal democracy, and in particular of different trends of opinion within the party. At least, this is the assessment which an important social democratic member of the PSOE, who took part in the preparatory meeting of the organizational conference which took place on Monday in Madrid, is making. In this meeting, according to what ABC has learned, a document was put together--essentially an agreement in principle between factions--which makes it highly possible that minority currents of opinion--not organized groups--could make up around 20 percent of the party's deliberative bodies. In a structure which up to the present has been ruled "with an iron hand" by the majority system, this is without doubt a significant and "conciliatory" change.

If the "doctrine" takes hold, various groups are going to emerge in the PSOE, in addition to those which have been functioning on a more or less token level. Luis Solana himself told this newspaper, with a good deal of conviction, that if the minorities take definite shape in the way agreed upon, he is going to start up a "social democratic current" within the PSOE.

But it seems that the document also marks out, with stark clarity, the always confused dividing line between currents and organized groups. Even more: everything indicates that the goal of the present leadership is to "normalize" the life of the party, integrating the currents and making their role a non-decisive one, in order to eliminate the cancer of organized factions, and as a result, the risk of schisms and splits. Another member of the Committee, this one belonging to the Socialist Left sector--the minority which up to now has been the most contentious one within the socialist structure--does not view the organizational remodelling so optimistically, especially when it comes to prickly issues. According to this source, there is no such principle of agreement on the definition, since they continue to envisage the "pure and simple" proportional system, and not "adjusted voting."

Therefore, in the opinion of the member of Socialist Left, it is more than probable that not just one document is going to go to the conference, but several of them, containing different positions. However, the general

impression is that the only thing that really needs to be discussed is the "question of numbers and percentages," but that agreement, a way of coming to an understanding, is possible. Social democrats, critics, and of course the "apparatus" agree on this.

Another unsettled matter, as we already reported yesterday, is that of the system of representation. In the opinion of Luis Solana, the topic has already become much less urgent with the advances which have been made in defining and giving participation to the "currents." The "critic" Pablo Castellano does not see it the same way. He predicts that agreement is not going to be achieved in that area, and that various proposals will be debated in the conference, not one joint document. "The most that the leadership is prepared to do is to change the majority system, by means of a greatly revised proportionality formula, so that a "mock proportional system," rather than a real proportional system, can emerge.

#### Against an Oligarchal System

Aside from the already mentioned topics which are to be discussed--currents and proportional representation--which seem to lie at the heart of the supposed "point of contention," there is another subject which could pass unnoticed, and which really could be the central issue of the organizational meeting--and not only of that--if an agreement is not reached earlier. It is clarification of the relations, functions and responsibilities between the "central authority of the party" and the "regional powers." In other words, rationalization of the general structure of the PSOE. As is known, the present by-laws define the Socialist Party as a "political organization of a federal type, constituted and structured on a base of national or regional parties or federations.."

And the autonomous configuration of the State presents a series of possibilities and risks for political structures of this type, which are obvious even to the less astute members of the present apparatus. None other than Felipe Gonzalez has already very persistently brought up the problem during his speeches in the Congress just past. "At all costs," he said, "we must avoid the risks of oligarchization of the party." It would be a catastrophe, according to the thinking of the party leadership, if in the present state of things, the regional power structure should gain such autonomy that they would be able to put pressure on the decisions and on the general policy of the PSOE. The idea is to put together a series of formulas and systems to curb and hinder this oligarchization. And there is no doubt that the fashioning of this "little PSOE autonomies law," as a well-known socialist from the more radical group rather wickedly phrased it, is going to have both a good and a bad side. The subject was dealt with in the last preparatory meeting, but "always on the level of principles, and not of specific points."

This topic is so important that Felipe Gonzalez himself is taking a direct part in handling it.

At the same time as those of the committee of experts, a series of meetings is taking place in which Felipe Gonzalez--and also Carmen Garcia Bloise--are debating the subject with the highest leaders of the regional and nationality parties. At this particular point, the socialists are trying to refrain from making any moves, and there will not be a preliminary document until at least the middle of September.

8131

CSO: 3110/220



## UGT PREPARED FOR TRADE UNION ELECTIONS

Madrid EL SOCIALISTA in Spanish 11-17 Aug 82 pp 32,34

[Interview with Anton Saracibar of the UGT [General Union of Workers] by EL SOCIALISTA reporter, date and place not given]

[Text] After the election preview which took place throughout Spain in the most important companies of the metallurgical and mining sectors, we are already in the final stretch of the trade union precampaign, which will start its takeoff in September. With only a month to go, the election machinery of the UGT is prepared, and the organization is "keyed-up," as the members say, to make the final leap. The leap toward definitive clarification of the union situation, after 5 years of political democracy and three union elections. This third time around the UGT has a firm hope of winning.

The brains of the election operations of the UGT, the one who brought this organization to its takeoff in 1980, is Anton Saracibar, organizational secretary of the UGT confederal executive committee. A Basque with an irresistible capacity for action, and a well-structured mind capable of solving the smallest or largest problems which may arise in a campaign as far-flung and varied as the union elections in the multitude of factories and areas all over Spain.

Anton Saracibar, who will again be responsible for the election procedure, admits that the UGT is going to go into these elections with a strong will to win.

With the slogan, "UGT, the union force for change," the organization is trying to turn these union elections into a definitive consolidation of democracy--which is impossible without consolidation of union power--and at the same time have them confirm the initiative and the need for change that the working class needs and demands. In seeking this ideal, the UGT is going to invest 150 million pesetas, which, since it is somewhat less than what the organization spent in previous elections--then it was around 300 million--"involves an economic effort of extraordinary magnitude," says Saracibar, "considering the present financial condition of the union." Before talking about the election goals of the UGT, Anton Saracibar makes it very clear that it would have been a good idea to postpone these union elections, as UGT had requested without success. "Not only so as to avoid coinciding with the political elections which are expected to be in November, but also because this year's

collective bargaining, since it also coincides with the union elections, is going to demand from the unions an extraordinary endeavor of care and imagination, which it did not have in 1980. Both situations could divert attention from the union election process, and hinder definitive clarification of the union situation."

Saracibar continues, "The goals that we want to achieve naturally begin with the obtaining of union supremacy for the General Union of Workers. But most of all, we are pledged to the task of once and for all consolidating unionism in our nation, which up until now has lagged behind political consolidation. We believe that it is essential to base class unionism on more than the 60 percent representation that it reached in 1980. In doing this it is fundamentally important to prevent abstention, and to reduce the proportion of so-called independent unions."

#### Nine Months for Elections

[Question] We are going to be taking a closer look, if you agree, at these objectives for the readers of EL SOCIALISTA; what stage are you at right now?

[Answer] To begin with, we are trying to get an agreement between the unions and the IMAC so as to set limits on the dates for counting these elections. We propose that the computation should take place between 15 March and 31 December. In this we agree with ELASTV [Solidarity of Basque Workers], while CCOO [Workers Commissions] are trying to have them be computed for the time period between 1 January 1982 and 31 December. We do not think this is a good idea, because it is too long and drawn-out a time. We believe that the period of 9 months between March and December is long enough to find out who is the winner. We are waiting for a decision from the administration on this matter. In any case, the recent elections which were held in metallurgical and mining companies, and another one in a food company which was held recently are still being tallied up. This makes for a greater interest in holding them, and in finding out their results. And we already know that the UGT is winning in the companies with more than 250 workers.

[Question] Another preliminary question in setting in motion this electoral process would be to find out how the National Agreement on Employment and the recent decree on temporary contracting are going to affect the workers; especially the latter, because of the possible cutting down of the number of votes.

[Answer] That depends on the election guidelines which the Ministry of Labor will publish one of these days. The UGT has asked the ministry to revise the 1980 regulations regarding the subject of the temporary workers, keeping in mind that at this time there are different contracting formulas that have to be taken into account. The new guidelines must make it easy for this type of temporary contract workers to participate. What I believe is that neither matters related to temporary contracts or to the National Agreement on Employment are going to have an influence on the elections, because in both cases the positions of the CCOO and of the UGT have been similar. The ANE

[National Agreement on Employment] was signed by both labor federations, and both, equally, have confirmed that decree on temporary contracting. Therefore, I do not believe there would be a change of votes from one federation to another for these reasons.

#### Prevent Abstention

[Question] But it could perhaps have an influence on abstention. Do you believe that there could be a high level of abstentions?

[Answer] We are going to try--and in order to do this we have lengthened the election process--to not have the abstention that there was in 1980. I believe that now the participation of the workers could be higher. It is not the same thing to hold elections in a month and a half time period as it is for 4 months.

[Question] Is there going to be any agreement among the unions for organization of the elections like the one they had in 1980?

[Answer] No, and I believe that this time one is not expected. We do not see a need for it because, in any case, the major portion of the elections are going to be held between 1 September and 31 December, and it will not be necessary to make a specific agreement. What really is necessary is to make an effort to get the great majority of the companies to hold their elections between those dates. In 1980 elections were held in only 38 percent of the companies in the nation, and 48 percent of the delegates were elected. It is not a very good percentage, of course, although there were extenuating circumstances from the union point of view. And we unions encounter enormous problems in holding elections in small companies with 6 to 10 workers, which also count, but where we unions have great difficulty in getting a foothold. Therefore, it is to be hoped that if we extend the period of computation we will be able to better the delegate percentage of 2 years ago.

#### More Monitoring of Results

[Question] Two years ago the elections were marked by an obvious attempt on the part of the government to manipulate them and to impose a third union alternative. Is there any indication yet of some type of maneuver by the government or by the employers to alter the union situation?

[Answer] Right now there is no indication of it. Perhaps it is still premature to make an appraisal of the attitude of the government or of the businessmen as regards the electoral process. At this time we can say that there will be better monitoring of the results than there was then, because the Provincial IMAC Councils are already set up, and we expect they are going to function conscientiously from 1 September to 31 December. This did not happen in 1980, when we had to improvise committees to monitor the results, in view of certain manipulations which we observed. As of now we already know that the monitoring committees are going to be made up of representatives of

government and business and only the two majority unions: UGT and CCOO...and in the case of the Basque Country and Galicia, also by ELASTV and ING. No union is going to be present that did not obtain 10 percent representation on the state or nationality level in 1980. Therefore, any possible manipulation by the government or the businessmen would be easily countered by the UGT and CCOO.

#### UGT Responsibility: Guarantee of Success

[Question] Have you set any goal to be reached regarding the number of delegates?

[Answer] We have the goal of winning, obviously. We hope to get 40 percent of the delegates, and in any case to have a minimum of 10 percent representation in every sector, so as to be represented in all the agreements that will be negotiated in 1983. I believe that we can easily surpass the results that we obtained in 1980, and do better than the CCOO, as is seen in the latest returns from the large companies. Because the policies which the UGT has evolved in the course of these two years have made even better contact with the working classes. It is clear that the UGT has taken the union initiative during these years. And the CCOO linked itself to that initiative when they also signed the ANE [National Agreement on Employment] that we had proposed, departing from their irresponsible positions and the verbal radicalism that they had carried on up til then. In short, I believe that the effectiveness of the UGT's union activity or the policy of responsibility which it has carried on is the greatest guarantee of its success in this election process. Therefore we are saying that this time the UGT may possibly win the elections.

Independent: Yes; Yellow: No

[Question] Going on to another topic. In the 1980 elections the UGT was very much in favor of the idea--and took appropriate action in some companies--of including candidates who were not affiliated with any union on its slates. Is it going to be the same this year?

[Answer] Yes. The last Confederal Committee thought it was appropriate to continue this policy of including non-affiliated persons or workers who call themselves independent on our slates. We are not doing this as a compromise, but in the firm conviction that it is the only way for the UGT to be the dominant union in this country, and to make contact with sectors which traditionally have had no relations with unionism. Besides, it is essential to include these non-affiliated workers; especially, if the UGT wants to get a foothold in companies with 25 or 30 workers or less, there is not other alternative than to put non-affiliated and independent persons on our slates.

[Question] The percentage of so-called independent unions was certainly quite high in 1980, and they take up a section of the vote which hinders concentration by the more aggressive unions; and is a barrier to clarification of the union situation in this country.

In 1980 these collections of acronyms accounted for almost a third of the overall results. Are you afraid that this situation will repeat itself?

[Answer] It is clear that the provisions of the Workers Statute relating to the Union Election Law should have contained some formula for avoiding the proliferation of unions without sufficient representation. But since there is absolutely nothing to prevent it, then, in fact, all the independent unions, and even independent candidacies, who have never entered an election process suddenly appear and run. As far as this goes, there is no other alternative than to hold elections and have the workers choose majority responsible unions, and not give their votes to this type of unions--so that they will gradually disappear. In any case, we on our part must also have an attitude which is prepared to take members of these many independent unions into our ranks as far as possible.

However, in many cases it does not only depend on the UGT, but on these unions agreeing to be integrated into a large-scale confederation. And then there are other types of unions, which, although they call themselves independent are not, but obviously are yellow unions, or employees of the bosses, and these, naturally, cannot be integrated into a union like ours. In any case, clarification of the union situation and of the difference between a yellow union and a union which is simply independent is going to be taking place all through this union process, and all through the collective bargaining; because it is the workers themselves who know about the candidates and the possible manipulations the company could carry on through certain ones of them.

[Question] Is the context of the general elections and what seems to be a possible socialist victory harmful or beneficial to the UGT?

[Answer] Well, I believe that it is beneficial, because everyone knows, and we have never denied it, that we are a union inspired by socialism, and that our relationship with the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] is a fraternal one. I believe that other unions are going to use this good relationship between the UGT and the PSOE as a point to criticize the General Union of Workers. It is clear that other unions are going to exploit this in their propaganda, but this does not mean that it agrees with reality--far from it. Naturally, we must make an in-depth study of how the UGT should behave toward a socialist government, it is true, as is happening in France. But, in any case, what we can say is that the UGT cannot be made subordinate to the policy of a government, even if the socialist party is in it. We are going to follow an aggressive policy as far as the workers' interests are concerned. This does not mean that we have to criticize the government systematically. We will criticize what should be criticized, as we have done up to now with the UCD [Democratic Center Union] government. But it also does not mean that we will give a blank check to a possible socialist government because of the fact that it is one.

Neither are we going to be subordinate to it. We must deny that emphatically, although we well know that this good relationship is going to be exploited and manipulated, especially by the other majority union.

[Question] Finally, how much money are you going to spend on this campaign?

[Answer] This year we have allotted 150 million; that is, half of what we spent in 1980. And we cannot go over that amount by as much as a centimo, given the critical economic situation in the organization, and the expenses that will be incurred at the same time with the collective bargaining.

We are going to devote special attention to the areas of industrial concentration, Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia...which are the very areas where we lost in 1980. If the vote there is favorable to the UGT this year, we can be sure that the UGT will win these elections.

8131

CSO: 3110/220

## DISK TRIAL CONTINUES WITH TORTURE ALLEGATION

Istanbul CUMHURİYET in Turkish 9 Sep 82 pp 1, 9

[Text] ISTANBUL NEWS SERVICE--Cross-examination of DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions] executive board member Celal Kucuk was concluded yesterday. Kucuk denied the statements read by the judge which he had made at the police station, saying these statements had been taken when he "was under great torture and blindfolded." Denying the police statement dated 3 November 1980, Kucuk said:

"They got this statement under great torture. I did not say anything. Not one word is mine. I was blindfolded and my hands were bound. They took my hand by force and made me sign it."

Celal Kucuk accepted his statements made at the office of the military prosecutor and, pointing out in this connection that the petition he had given to the arresting court concerning torture had been lost, gave the court a three-page petition on the subject. Kucuk requested that he be released, but the request was denied by the court.

It was seen that defendants Tahir Guner and Fikri Tanta did not attend yesterday's trial, begun at 1030 hours, because of illness. Celal Kucuk's questioning was resumed following the roll call.

Celal Kucuk was asked: "What was the goal of DISK's worker education? How was it conducted? What are the type A education notes?" He replied:

"DISK is a professional organization established on the union plan. In view of this, there was a set of responsibilities placed upon it by law. One of these is education. The relevant article of Law No 274 says that at least 5 percent of the union's funds must go for education. Based on the articles of this law, DISK offered its members courses in seminars, the content of which was explained earlier. The type A training seminars were given to members as courses taken from a text consisting of 100 pages, mimeographed but not printed, and which had no title but which I may describe as 'DISK Education Notes.'"

The judge then asked whether he was referring to the "DISK Type A Education Notes" mentioned in article 5(d) of the resolution adopted at the DISK General Executive Board meeting number 39 and dated 30 June, 1-2 July 1977, as entered on page 292 of the indictment. Celal Kucuk said that the book mentioned there was not the notes to which he referred, that the book was one printed and sold by a publishing house which used DISK's name but had no connection with DISK. "There is no such book prepared by DISK," he said.

The judge then asked about the mass actions organized by DISK and the 20 March anti-fascism action. "What was the underlying purpose of these actions?" he asked.

Celal Kucuk replied as follows:

"In democracies, unions perform the task of a pressure group. This is their legal right. The failure of the economic policies applied by the political administrations to be oriented to the people had caused a great deal of confusion. It had reached the point where one could not go out on the street, where many people were being killed every day. DISK adopted the resolution to hold the 20 March anti-fascism action for the purpose of preventing this surge of fascism, preventing the killing, and announced the resolution publicly. It did this in order to create pressure against the attitude of the political administrations in this regard. Suit has been brought and concluded on this topic."

When the judge asked, "Why did DISK assume this task which the state should do," he replied, "It was not assuming the state's job," and said the following in connection with the 1 May rallies:

"The 1 May rally and demonstrations were held by state permission and under state safeguard. I deny all charges in the indictment as to mass actions."

Judge Guvener then asked, "Do you have anything else to say as regards the indictment?" Celal Kucuk said that he would stress two points and, adding that he did "not accept the strike charges of the indictment," continued:

"There is, furthermore, a charge on pages 84 and 90 of the indictment relating to the Afghanistan incident. We made a public announcement of our thinking in this regard. The prime minister did not even make a statement taking this clear a stance on this matter. We do not accept the sit-in incident. I reject all charges related to it."

Celal Kucuk's police statements of 30 September 1980 and 3 November 1980 were then read and he was asked for his comments.

After the reading of the 30 September 1980 statement, Celal Kucuk said:

"I was brought blindfolded. I was quickly taken from the vehicle and struck many times by fists on my back and shoulders. I was taken into a large, closed, noisy building. My statement was taken here under duress and torture



with my eyes bound. They asked me questions and I answered them. But I do not know what they wrote. Many passages of the statement read were written by them. I do not accept them."

After reading of the 3 November 1980 police statement, he said:

"They took it under great torture. I did not say anything. It was written by those who conducted the questioning while I was blindfolded. Not even a single word is mine. The signature is mine. But, although I was in handcuffs, they took my hand by force and made me sign it."

Celal Kucuk said that he accepted his statements at the office of the military prosecutor and the arraignment dated 21 January 1982 and 26 February 1982, which were read next, and pointed out that he had given the arraignment court an eight-page petition concerning the torture, but had learned from his attorney that this petition had been lost. He gave the court a three-page petition on the same topic. Kucuk then presented another four-page petition to the judicial committee requesting his release.

Following the completion of Kucuk's questioning, Kenan Akman requested in a petition to the court that his political and union personality be the subject of questioning and also that he be given photocopies of the documents taken from the case file by his attorney.

Stating his opinion, the prosecutor called for rejection of these requests. The court accepted the prosecutor's opinion and denied Kucuk's request for release and the other requests, adding that trial was postponed until Wednesday, 15 September, at 1030 hours when the questioning of executive board member Kemal Nebioglu would begin.

8349

CSO: 4654/447

## HELICOPTERS, SHIPS, REGIMENTS LANDING IN LEBANON LISTED

## Tank, Paratroop Infantry Regiments

Paris COLS BLEUS in French 4 Sep 82 p 20

[Article: "Mission in Lebanon"]

[Text] Events in Lebanon have caused many French Navy ships to be dispatched to that area. On 18 June, the Paquet Cruise Line's passenger ship "Azur," chartered by the French government, arrived in Toulon with 600 French and 400 foreign evacuees from Beirut. At the same time, the destroyer "Montcalm," the BDC [tank landing ship] "Argens," and the PR [replenishment tanker] "Meuse" were cruising in the waters off Beirut. On 14 July, after the naval review at Toulon, the destroyer "Dupleix," the BDC "Dives," and the flagship "Rance" [of the Fleet Training Center] left for the Beirut area to relieve the aforementioned three ships. Since then, the destroyer "Georges Leygues" has been dispatched to replace the "Dupleix."

This French naval presence off the coast of Lebanon made it possible to organize the landing of French troops sent to assist in the evacuation of Palestinian forces and thereby bring a halt to the fighting. The dock landing ship "Orage" left Toulon for Lebanon on 22 August carrying another detachment of 200 men and considerable equipment: 62 jeeps, armored cars, trucks, etc.

These troops had arrived in Toulon the previous day, 21 August: 1st Squadron, Marine Infantry-Tank Regiment (RICM) from Vannes, an element of the 3d Marine Paratroop Infantry Regiment (RPIMA) from Carcassonne, and an element of the 17th Paratroop Engineer Regiment from Montauban.

The following dignitaries were present at the departure ceremony: Admiral Leenhardt, navy chief of staff, Mr Cailleteau, deputy director of the defense minister's personal staff, Admiral Orosco, commander-in-chief Mediterranean, Rear Admiral Bonavita, General Schmidt, commanding general 11th Airborne (Paratroop) Division, and General Pascuali, military governor of Marseilles.

A naval detachment served as honor guard on the Milhaud pier where the defense minister's representative, flag officers, and general officers reviewed the soldiers departing for Lebanon and the "Orage's" crew.

Commander Gelez, the "Orage's" captain, welcomed the dignitaries aboard. They sailed with him into Vignettes Roads where they were set ashore. Before leaving the ship, Admiral Leenhardt spoke to the crew and the soldiers from the bridge. He conveyed to them "the defense minister's greetings and confidence" in them. He concluded his remarks by wishing them: "fair winds and fair seas."

The freighter "Luberon" arrived from La Rochelle, at the port of Toulon where it took aboard additional equipment and supplies for the RICM. Lastly, the frigate "Premier Maitre L'Her" and the escort destroyer "D'Estrees" also set sail for Beirut.

The French Navy and French Merchant Marine, in partnership with the French Army's assistance forces, are playing a role of first-rate importance in establishing the screen of forces designed to permit peace to be restored in Lebanon.

#### Role of Aircraft

Paris COLS BLEUS in French 18 Sep 82 p 16

[Article: "Mission in Beirut for French Naval Force"]

[Text] When a naval force organized around an aircraft carrier recalls all crews from leave and hastily sets sail, the force's mission cannot be an ordinary one.

On the morning of 17 September, the [carrier] "Foch," the [destroyer] "Duquesne," and the [tanker] "Meuse," having left Toulon on 7 September, were off the coast of Lebanon where they joined the "Georges Leygues," the "D'Estrees," the "Premier Maitre L'Her," the "Orage," and the "Dives."

Their mission: pick up French troops of the Beirut interposition force: more than 800 men, 200 vehicles ranging from jeeps to armored vehicles, ammunition, and quantities of other equipment and supplies to be loaded on the "Foch," "Meuse," "Orage," and "Dives." Moreover, we had to complete this task before midnight 13 September.

The French ambassador, accompanied by the commanding general of the interposition force, boarded the "Foch" where they briefed naval officers on the situation. An embarkation and loading plan was approved which endeavored to get around constraints and difficulties while still providing continuous protection for French ships. The plan went into effect on the morning of 11 September and was implemented in three phases.

On 11 September, the [dock landing ship] "Orage" took aboard its first load of materiel destined for the "Foch" and "Meuse." All of this materiel was helicopter-transportable. During this operation, the combat ships and aircraft from the naval air group displayed their presence in international waters.

On 12 September, a "conveyor belt" of Super Frelon [transport helicopters] transferred the materiel from the "Orage" onto the "Foch" and "Meuse" in 160 round-trip flights, while these underway ships were escorted by vigilant destroyers.

At the same time, the [tank landing ship] "Dives," escorted by the "D'Estrees," entered the port and began its loading.

On 13 September, it was the "Orage's" turn to draw alongside the Beirut pier for its final load and to recover its EDIC's [landing craft vehicle and personnel]. The Super Frelon helicopters resumed their shuttle operations at dawn. They completed their loading of the "Foch" and "Meuse" and then picked up the men of the interposition force from the pier. These operations required some 100 round-trip flights.

This last day was marked by a military parade reviewed by the secretary of state to the minister of defense accompanied by the ambassador, the admiral, and the general. This ceremony gave the honor guard from the "Foch" an opportunity to catch a glimpse of the city of Beirut. When viewed from the sea at dawn, the city looked beautiful and almost intact. But the route taken by the honor guard to the parade site--the demarcation line between the communities--was completely bordered with ruins. All embarkation and loading operations were completed by 1800. The combat ships moved in line along the jetty, saluted the ambassador, and then assumed their transit formation with sorrowful feelings of sympathy for this country and people who want to live. We could now say that we had accomplished the active phase of our mission.

During the return trip, paratroopers of the 2d REP [Paratroop Foreign Legion Regiment] and 3d RPIMA told us about their stay in Lebanon.

8041

CSO: 3100/983

## AREAS FOR POSSIBLE AUSTERITY IN MILITARY BUDGET DISCUSSED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Aug-Sep 82 pp 153-155

[Article by Georges Vincent: "Rigorous Prospects for the Armed Forces"]

[Text] The recent devaluation of the franc will obviously not be without consequences for the purchasing power of the armed forces. The price hikes in energy and imported raw materials will affect arms manufacture, the rise in the prices of fuels will slow down the "activities" of the forces. The wane and price freeze will only last for a time and it is to be feared that next fall their rise will continue. In these circumstances the promotion of exports will only benefit our arms sales if our prices remain competitive and if the series produced are large enough to lower the costs, which, alas, is doubtful if our armed forces cannot themselves set the example with orders.

These worries are not ours alone; they currently haunt many who, to various degrees, have responsibility in the area of defense and who are anxious to know what resources the next budget will give them and what "format," to use an expression coined by Charles Hernu, minister of defense, the future planning law for 1984-1988, the draft of which is to be submitted to Parliament in 1983, will adopt for our armed forces.

At a presentation of our land forces and a demonstration of their firepower last 3 May, Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy, questioned by Jacques Isnard from LE MONDE, had reaffirmed his desire to respect the promise he had made to increase the defense budget to 3.94 percent of the gross national product in 1983. However, his answer did not dispel doubts. He said: "I will meet with you again when voting for the next budget takes place. I am in the process of preparing it and I am not forgetting what I said. I hope, consequently, to be able to confirm it to you...."

At the beginning of June, Charles Hernu called together the highest military authorities in the [Ministry of] Defense--staff officers, inspectors generals, regional commanders, and so on--and spoke unequivocally. After rejoicing about the existing consensus among public opinion and political organizations on the basic principles of our defense, and after having appealed to the discipline of the military leaders to promote change in the army by modifying the style of hierarchial relationships and the substance of national service in the direction of better efficiency and greater brotherhood, the minister continued in these terms:

"Finally, I want to bring up the essential point for the future of our armed forces. It will be outlined by way of the 1983 budget, then by the 1984-1988 planning law. While it is too soon to discuss details of the budget and this law, it is now possible to know what our guiding rule will be in the coming years. The world economic situation demands an unusually stringent effort from our country in order to get out of the crisis it has been in for 7 years. Everyone will have to take part in this effort and, as can be expected, the [Ministry of] Defense cannot escape it. Nor would that be desirable.... As you notice, I am inviting you to make a particularly stringent effort."

But, even if the much repeated promise to allot 3.94 percent of the 1983 GNP to defense--a rate which, according to the promises of the preceding government, would have already been reached at the end of 1982--in any case, because of the slow growth of the GNP and because of the desire announced by the government to limit the budget deficit, possibly there will be only a small increase over 1982, an increase which in any case, is likely to be insufficient to compensate for the price hikes, even though they have been contained for several months.

One way or another, the armed forces are very probably going to have to make an effort at austerity. It remains to be seen on what types of expenditures and on what programs it can be accomplished.

Before hazarding some guesses on this subject, one thing must be said: If there is a category of servants too disciplined and too imbued with a sense of service to the nation to ever bargain with its effort at solidarity, it is surely the military.

The remunerations and social payments (RCS) for [the Ministry of] Defense for all categories, military and civilian, are 44 billion francs on a total of 122.855 billion francs (or 36 percent) of the payment funding this department.\* In 1982 the salaries for active officers and noncommissioned officers were 28.128 billion francs, 22.640 billion francs of which was for noncommissioned officers. As for the "loan" for the 262,000 conscripted soldiers, it makes up only 1.3 billion francs of this RCS. Conscription is really the least expensive manpower system. Savings in this area would be as pitiful as they would be uncalled for.

In addition to the RCS, Title III (operating funds) also includes current expenditures and part of those related to the activities and to the building up of operational stocks. Now, under current expenditures, savings are hardly to be hoped for. In fact, in this classification of costs the following are included: 1) what is called the "programmed maintenance of personnel," that is, clothing, housing, lodging and furnishing; 2) food; 3) operations, that is, living expenses of unit and departmental personnel, physical maintenance of the infrastructure, travel expenses and non-operational transportation,

---

\*The RCS represents 46 percent of the land army budget and 76.4 percent of that of the gendarmerie.

maintenance of materials, means of instruction. All of these expenses are a direct function of the numbers of soldiers and almost irreducible.

The portion of these living expenses varies from one branch of the armed forces to another: it is 16 percent of the budget for the land army, 13 percent in the gendarmerie, but only 8 percent in the air force and the navy.

What remains then are expenditures related to activities and operational supplies which also include programmed equipment maintenance, ammunition and operational fuels. It is probably this latter category that is going to be the most sensitive and cause the most worries, particularly for the air force for which operational fuels represent 2.366 billion francs in 1982, and in the navy for which they are almost a billion francs, while they cost the land army 0.78 billion francs, which is still 10.5 percent of the operating expenditures of this branch of the service. It is difficult to see how air activities, which at presently only insure the minimum of 15 hours of flight per pilot compatible with safety (180 hours per year per combat plane), can be reduced. Nor can there be any question of reducing the activity of the fleet and of navy flights without reducing the credibility of our deterrent, the safety of our sea routes and of the DOM-TOM [Overseas departments and territories], and even the prestige of our fleet throughout the world. On the other hand, how can we reduce the activities of the land forces when a more active national service is being so vigorously called for?

So must we attack Title V, or the capital expenditures which, in addition to ammunition and replacements (9.6 percent of the budget) include research (18.5 percent), manufacturing (18.9 percent), and the infrastructure (3.9 percent)?

To reduce the research would compromise the future or retard the development of state-of-the-art technologies. Is that conceivable at a time when the chief of state and the cabinet are reaffirming their will to safeguard and to modernize our deterrent apparatus which is the backbone of our defense? While the sixth missile-launching nuclear submarine, Inflexible, has just been launched and the preparatory work for the seventh, first of a new generation, has been undertaken according to the wishes of the president of the republic and the development of the new mobile land nuclear component probably will not be delayed, will the study and development of the tactical missile, Hades, which is to replace the Pluton and which has already been delayed a year because of the freeze in funding for tactical nuclear weapons in 1982, be delayed still longer?

Now, if the conventional equipment being developed is considered, the victims of austerity surely would not be Atlantic-G2 which is to replace the model in service on which the minister of defense just took a flight, nor the Mirage-200 RD1, whose completion has already been delayed too long, nor the new Matra Super-530 air-to-air missile, nor the midrange air-to-ground missile (ASMP) nor the new plane motors M-53 and M-88. On the other hand, the pause which affected the progress of development funds for the land army last year may be prolonged into 1983, all the more since the French-German

cooperation project for the new "principal combat tank" seems definitively abandoned. So we will have to keep our old AMX-30 tanks, of which the improved version 30-B2 is coming out very slowly, for a long time still. We would be lucky to see the accomplishment in 1983 of the planning law for the 155-AUF1 cannon, the AMX-10 RC and the tactical vehicles, for which the orders and deliveries have undergone considerable delays.

Finally, we will probably also have to be patient about the rate of modernization of the infrastructure of the three branches of the armed forces.

But none of that is very dramatic if the austerity is only going to last for a year. If it should be prolonged, then critical choices would have to be made. Uncertainty is still there, however, and that is what is making the position of our planning officials uncomfortable at the time when they are working on the model for the 1984-1988 law which will impact the future of our armed forces practically until the end of the century.

9969

CSO: 3100/903



## GREEK LANGUAGE TEACHING IN SOVIET SCHOOLS REPORTED

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 24 Aug 82 p 5

[Excerpts] Moscow--August (by Giannis Nikolopoulos). A year ago this time--August--the first seminar for teachers of modern Greek in the schools of Georgia took place in Sukhumi. Over 50 persons gathered from Tbilisi, Sukhumi, Batum, Roustawi, Chalka and the areas of Chirichkaro, Dmani, Kobuleti, Borzom [all names transliterated].

The seminar met at the postgraduate center of the Abkhazia Teachers Academy. At the opening session of the seminar there were speeches by the secondary schools director of the Ministry of Education of the Georgian Republic, T. Tatisvili, and the deputy minister of education of the Abkhazia Autonomous Republic, T. Rogatsoua.

Among the officials present at the ceremonies was V. Alexandrou, responsible for the sector of Science and Higher Education of the Communist Party of Georgia, T. Tsotsia, responsible for propaganda in Sukhumi, and N. Konstandinidis, the deputy mayor of the city.

The objective of the seminar was to improve the educational and language skills of modern Greek teachers in the schools of the Georgian Republic. To promote this objective several top specialists were invited from Moscow, including M. Rytowa, professor in the School of International Relations and author of a modern Greek textbook used in the Soviet schools, and Sonja Ilinskaya (known in Greece for her translations, lectures and as the wife of writer Mitsos Alexandropoulos) in charge of the Greek literature of the Balkan Studies Institute of the Soviet Academy of Science. Present also was N. Martikian, specialist in methodology in the Soviet Ministry of Education. There was an announcement concerning the founding of a "Modern Greek and English" school at the Teachers School in Moscow which will graduate teachers for secondary education, having such specialists.

This information was published in the newspaper SOVIET ABHAZIA on 18 August 1981. The issue reached me, passed from hand to hand, with a 1 year delay. But the report has not lost its timeliness.

During a recent trip to Caucasus I had the opportunity to pass through Sukhumi and to visit Theofilos Popovidis. At another time I will write about the

hospitality and adventures and the dramatic life of this man. Now I will complete only the report of the promotion of modern Greek in the Soviet schools.

Fifteen young Greeks were studying last year in the Krupskaya Teachers Academy in Moscow and another 15 this year will become the first graduate teachers of modern Greek by 1986. The decision to teach modern Greek in secondary schools does not refer only to the Georgian republic. It refers to the entire Soviet Union. This is because the Greek nationality, recognized in the context of the multinational structure of the USSR, does not have its autonomous region in which Greek could be established as the primary language.

The implementation started in Georgia because there exists in Georgia the most compact Greek population. But there are Greek populations in the southern regions of the Russian republic as well as in the Ukraine.

7520

CSO: 4621/499

GENERAL

GREECE

KKE-INT. MESSAGE TO ROMANIA

Athens I AVGI in Greek 24 Aug 82 p 1

[Text] On the occasion of the Romanian anniversary, the following message was sent to Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party and President of the Socialist Republic of Romania Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu in Bucharest:

Dear Comrade:

On the occasion of the 38th anniversary of the liberation of Romania from the fascist yoke, please accept the warm congratulations of the Central Committee of our party and of me personally.

Led by the communists during those years, your country entered a course for the construction of an independent socialist Romania in the interests of its people, and its role is becoming increasingly more active for turning the Balkans into a zone of peace, while its contribution is increasing in the struggle of the European peoples and of all the peoples for peace, national independence and progress.

Our party, the workers and all the Greek people express the wish on the occasion of this national holiday for success in the task of the Romanian Communist Party, of you personally, and of the entire Romanian people for building a new life in your country.

With comradely greetings  
Giannis Baniias  
Secretary of the Central Committee  
of KKE-Int.

Athens 23 Aug 82

7520  
CSO: 4621/499

GENERAL

GREECE

BRIEFS

POSSIBLE SALONICA-PLOVDIV CONNECTION--Comrade Ilia Petrou, the consul general of Bulgaria in Salonica, formally visited Mayor Thanasis Gianousis and exchanged views regarding Plovdiv and Salonica sisterhood. Comrade Petrou conveyed to Th. Gianousis the invitation of Plovdiv's mayor to visit the city. Gianousis accepted the invitation. [Text] [Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 25 Aug 82 p 9] 7520

CSO: 4621/499

END

B1 - CONTROL NUMBER: U350137  
B4 - ACCESSION NUMBER: .....JPRS-81945  
B3 - COLLECTION CODE: 3  
B6 - MANAGEMENT CODE: XR  
B7 - PROCESS ACTNG CD: 01 B7A-REGISTRATION FEE: 00000  
B8 - PRODUCT MANAGER: H  
B9 - RECEIPT TYPE: 1 B9A-LOAN DUE OUT:  
B10- TRANSACTION: TN B10A-DUPE/PRIOR/SUPER:  
B12- RETURNS: 0 B12A-RETURN DATE:  
B13- PROCESSING: 1  
B14- PAT. POTENTIAL: 0  
B17- FORM/PRICE: 12002 ,  
B18- ANNOUNCE: 0000  
B19- PUBLICATION-1: U8307 B20- PUBLICATION-2:  
B21- LIMITATION: 0  
B23- PC BIN: 000  
B24- STOCK: 0009 B24A-STOCK TYPE CODES: D  
B25- PAGES/SHEETS: 00084  
B26- PC PRICE CODE: A05  
B27- DOMESTIC PRICE: 0000000 B28- FOREIGN PRICE: 0000000  
B29- ACTION CODES: SS  
B33- MN PRICE CODE: X00  
B34- DOMESTIC PRICE: 0000000 B35- FOREIGN PRICE: 0000000  
B36- ACTION CODES: XM  
B37- RELEASABILITY CD: A  
B38- MF PRINT: D  
B39- ADDITIONAL INFO: n  
B40- PRINT PC: n  
B41- PC DUE: n  
B42- SOURCE ORDER: n  
B42A-GENERATE RDP: 0  
B42B-SUPPLIER SRC CD: n  
@06 )West Europe Report, No. 2041.[ @@@  
@11 )7 Oct 82,[ @@@  
@@@